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CAN THE BATTLE BE WON? COMPAQ, THE SHAM
TRANSACTION DOCTRINE, AND A CRITIQUE OF
PROPOSALS TO COMBAT THE CORPORATE
TAX SHELTER DRAGON
BRION D. GRABERt
At a time when our Congress seems reluctant to seek to slay, or even in-
jure, the corporate tax shelter dragon, our courts, and particularly the
Tax Court, are building the walls of the fortress from such time-tested
concepts as form versus substance and economic substance and risk of
loss, to protect the fisc from being overrun and trampled by such tax
shelters.
INTRODUCTION
Recently, corporate tax shelters have become one of the biggest
areas of concern in the United States's tax policy.2 The Department
of the Treasury ("Treasury"),3 Congressman Lloyd Doggett,4 the Joint
t B.B.A. 1998, University of Michigan; J.D. Candidate 2001, University of Pennsyl-
vania; C.PT 1999. I would like to acknowledge Robert G. Boehmer, Randy E. Preston,
and the many other fine educators from whom I have learned so much. I would also
like to thank my family and friends for supporting me in my chosen endeavors.
More generally, a special debt of gratitude is owed by all Americans to the tens of
thousands of men and women employed by the Internal Revenue Service. These indi-
viduals do an extraordinaryjob each year of collecting the revenues that fund the serv-
ices and activities of the federal government. Seldom, however, do people appreciate
the magnitude or difficulty of this undertaking. Thank you for the job you do.
I Stefan F. Tucker, 0! lWhat Men Dare Do! What Men May Do! What Men Daily Do,
Not Knowing What They Do!, NEWSL. (ABA Section of Taxation, Washington, D.C.), Win-
ter 2000, at 21, 22.
L See R)yanJ. Donmoyer, Debate Over Tax Shelters Dominates Finance Hearing, 2000 TAX
NOTES TODA 47-2, WL 2000 TNT 47-2 (quoting Lawrence H. Summers, Treasury Sec-
retary, who has called corporate tax shelters "'the most significant compliance problem
in the Internal Revenue Code today'").
See Lawrence H. Summers, Tackling the Growth of Corporate Tax Shelters, Ad-
dress to the Federal Bar Association (Feb. 28, 2000), in 2000 TAX NOTES TODAY 40-34,
WL 2000 TNT 40-34 (outlining the steps that should be taken in response to corporate
tax shelters). Most importantly, on February 28, 2000, the Department of the Treasury
issued temporary and proposed regulations intended to curb the abuse of corporate
tax shelters. See T.D. 8875, 2000-11 I.R.B. 761 (requiring corporate tax shelter pro-
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Committee on Taxation,5 and the New York State Bar Association,6
among others, have all made proposals on how to deal with this grow-
ing problem that deprives the federal treasury of over ten billion dol-
lars per year.7 Using the September 1999 Tax Court decision Compaq• • 8
Computer Corp. v. Commissioner as a framework, this Comment will ex-
moters to maintain customer lists); T.D. 8876, 2000-11 I.R.B. 753 (requiring corporate
tax shelter registration); T.D. 8877, 2000-11 I.R.B. 747 (requiring taxpayer disclosure
of participation in corporate tax shelters); see also DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, THE
PROBLEM OF CORPORATE TAX SHELTERS: DISCUSSION, ANALYSIS AND LEGISLATIVE
PROPOSALS (1999) [hereinafter TREASURY WHITE PAPER] (providing background on
the corporate tax shelter problem and making proposals to solve it).
4 See Abusive Tax Shelter Shutdown Act of 1999, H.R. 2255, 106th Cong. (1999)
(attempting to eliminate abusive corporate tax shelters).
5 See JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, STUDY OF PRESENT-LAW PENALTY AND
INTEREST PROVISIONS AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 3801 OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE
SERVICE RESTRUCTURING AND REFORM ACT OF 1998 (INCLUDING PROVISIONS RELATING
TO CORPORATE TAX SHELTERS) (1999) [hereinafter JCT PROPOSAL] (making sugges-
tions to reduce corporate tax shelter activity).
6 See Tax Section, New York State Bar Ass'n, Comments on the Administration's Corpo-
rate Tax Shelter Prnosals, 83 TAX NOTES 879 (1999) (proposing ways to combat the cor-
porate tax shelter problem).
7 See David R. Francis, Bye-Bye Corporate Tax Revenues, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
Nov. 3, 1999, at 8, 8 ("Lost revenue in fiscal 1999 alone could be $13 billion to $24 bil-
lion ... ."); Janet Novack & Laura Saunders, The Hustling of X-Rated Shelters, FORBES,
Dec. 14, 1998, at 198, 199 ("These unintended tax breaks are saving corporate buyers
up to $10 billion in tax a year.... [The tax shelter] business is booming and there's
nothing to slow itdown .... "). But see Ian Springsteel, Helter Shelter, CFO, June 1, 1999,
at 81, 1999 WL 8850916 (stating that the accuracy of the claim that corporate tax shel-
ters are a $10 billion per year problem has never been proven). A fairly intense debate
has raged over the amount of tax revenue, if any, that has actually been lost due to
corporate tax shelters. See, e.g., Kenneth J. Kies, Corporate Tax Base Erosion is Still Un-
proven, 86 TAX NOTES 1445, 1446 (2000) ("I stand by my contention that there is no
convincing data that would indicate that 'corporate tax shelters' are eroding the cor-
porate income tax base.");Jasper L. Cummings, Jr. & AlanJ. Swirski, Interview With Dr.
Martin A. Sullivan, NEWSL. (ABA Section of Taxation, Washington, D.C.), Spring 2000,
at 20, 20 (asserting that there has been "a recent decline in corporate tax receipts rela-
tive to book income" and that an increase in the use of corporate tax shelters is one
likely explanation).
Nevertheless, it is generally accepted among tax professionals that there is a corpo-
rate tax shelter problem. See Donmoyer, supra note 2, ("[M]ost tax professional groups
agree that 'there is a tax shelter problem, make no mistake about that.'" (quoting Pe-
ter L. Faber, a partner at McDermott, Will & Emery)). Furthermore, the frequency
with which corporate tax shelters are currently marketed to companies, the sizeable
fees promoters charge for many of these tax shelters, and the amount of tax benefits at
issue in recent corporate tax shelter cases all provide substantial anecdotal evidence of
a drain on corporate tax receipts. If companies could not greatly reduce their tax li-
ability by participating in corporate tax shelters, why would companies ever buy tax
shelters? If companies were not buying, why would promoters continue to devote re-
sources to creating and marketing tax shelters?
8 113 T.C. 214 (1999).
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amine the merits of these recent proposals, giving due consideration
to traditional, primarily judicial, solutions.
Part I explains the facts of Compaq, focusing on the specific corpo-
rate tax shelter at issue in the case. The transaction, in essence, in-
volved Compaq Computer Corp. ("Compaq") purchasing stock of a
foreign corporation on which a dividend had been declared but not
yet paid. After the dividend record date, Compaq sold the stock at a
price equal to its original purchase price less the amount of the net
dividend. Compaq was required to pay tax to a foreign country on the
receipt of the dividend, and thus was able to claim a foreign tax credit.
The opportunity to claim the tax credit was the goal of the entire
transaction, and allowed Compaq to reduce its tax liability from unre-
lated transactions on a dollar per dollar basis.
Part II provides an analysis of the sham transaction doctrine that is
crucial to understanding both the Compaq opinion and the merits of
the proposed solutions to the corporate tax shelter problem. The
courts have developed the sham transaction doctrine over the last
sixty-five years to distinguish those transactions that should be recog-
nized for tax purposes from those that should not, based primarily on
whether the transaction possessed economic substance or a business
purpose absent its tax effects. The analysis explains what factors the
courts examine in making that determination.
With the background provided in Part II, Part III returns to Com-
paq to examine the Tax Court's opinion. The Tax Court relied heavily
on the sham transaction doctrine in concluding that the transaction
was an economic sham lacking both nontax economic substance and a
nontax business purpose. The opinion also explains why an accuracy-
related penalty was properly assessed against Compaq for its tax return
reporting of the transaction.
Finally, Part IV examines several of the primary proposals to com-
bat corporate tax shelters and identifies those that are constructive to
pursue. Although not the principal focus of this Comment, special
attention is given to discussing Treasury's temporary and proposed
regulations because they are the most authoritative measure taken to
date against corporate tax shelters.
This Comment asserts that requiring greater disclosure by corpo-
rations of potentially abusive transactions has the greatest capacity to
curb corporate tax shelter abuse. Treasury is currently employing this
strategy in the temporary and proposed regulations. Although the ac-
tual impact of the temporary and proposed regulations is not yet
known, increased disclosure should allow the Commissioner of the In-
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ternal Revenue Service ("Commissioner") to expend his resources ex-
amining the merits of the disclosed transactions and disallowing those
that are abusive, instead of aimlessly searching for potentially abusive
transactions in the first place. Such a change should put an immedi-
ate end to many of the corporate tax shelters, which derive their value
from the fact that they are unlikely ever to be discovered, rather than
from any solid legal basis.
In addition, modifying the existing penalty structure would be
beneficial, but only if done in conjunction with the new disclosure re-
quirements. Modifications to the penalty system would provide addi-
tional incentives for taxpayers, whose compliance is voluntary, to act
within the law. A similar benefit could be achieved by imposing an
excise tax on the fees of corporate tax shelter promoters and advisors
arising from nondisclosed corporate tax shelters.
Other proposals, such as codifying the existing judicial anti-tax-
avoidance doctrines and providing consequences for tax-indifferent
parties who participate in corporate tax shelters, however, are not
beneficial and may actually exacerbate the corporate tax shelter prob-
lem by reopening closed loopholes or creating new ones. At its best,
codification would simply repeat current, well established judicial doc-
trine. At its worst, codification would increase tax complexity and un-
certainty for taxpayers and retard the ability of the Commissioner and
the courts to enforce the tax laws. These proposals should not be pur-
sued.
I. THE FACTS OF COMPAQ
Compaq's desire to minimize the tax liability resulting from a
sizeable long-term capital gain on the July 1992 sale of stock it held in
a publicly traded, nonaffiliated computer company provided the im-
petus for the transaction at issue in Compaq.9 Shortly after the stock
sale, Twenty-First Securities Corp. ("Twenty-First"), an investment
firm, solicited Compaq's participation in a transaction designed to
shield part of the long-term capital gain from tax.10 During the first
meeting on September 15, 1992, Twenty-First presented two suggested
transactions to James J. Tempesta, an assistant treasurer at Compaq,
and John M. Foster, Compaq's treasurer: a Dividend Reinvestment
9 See id. at 215 (1999) (discussing the sale of Conner Peripherals, Inc. stock).
1o Id.
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Arbitrage Program and an ADR arbitrage." The day after the meet-
ing, Compaq notified Twenty-First of its decision to pursue the ADR
transaction. 2 Compaq made this decision based on a telephone con-
versation with a single Twenty-First reference and a review of a spread-
sheet provided by Twenty-First, but without performing even a cash
flow analysis of the transaction. 3
Immediately upon learning of Compaq's decision, Twenty-First
began to execute the ADR transaction. 14 The only guidance from
Compaq during the transaction concerned the number of shares to
purchase and the suggestion that the ADRs used should be those of
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. ("Royal Dutch").' Twenty-First decided
from whom to purchase the ADRs, how large each trade should be,
and "the market prices to be paid," but did not discuss these details
with anyone from Compaq.
6
Ultimately, Twenty-First ordered the purchase of ten million ADR
shares of Royal Dutch on Compaq's behalf. The shares were pur-
chased "cum dividend" and resold "ex dividend" in twenty-three sepa-
rate cross trades that were completed in approximately one hour.
7
All ten million shares were purchased from a long-time client of
Twenty-First, and then immediately resold to that same company.18
The purchase cross trades were settled on September 17, pursuant to
special "next day" settlement terms allowed by the New York Stock Ex-
changer' The resale cross trades were settled on September 21, pur-
suant to regular settlement rules.20 Arranging the settlements in this
way allowed Compaq to be the shareholder of record of the ADRs on
the dividend record date, thereby entitling Compaq to receive the de-
clared dividend.'
When Royal Dutch paid the dividend to its United States resident
n "An ADR (American Depository Receipt) is a trading unit issued by a trust which
represents ownership of stock in a foreign corporation that is deposited with the trust.
ADR's are the customary form of trading foreign stocks on U.S. stock exchanges." Id.
Id. at 216.
I ld.
'a Id. at 217.
- Brief for Respondent: "ADR" Issue at 8, Compaq (No. 24238-96).
' Compaq, 113 T.C. at 217.
7An ADR purchased cum dividend includes the right to receive a dividend that
has been declared, while one purchased ex dividend does not include that right. Id. at
215-16.
I' d. at 217.
" Id. at 218.
Id.
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shareholders, including Compaq, it withheld and paid over to the ap-
propriate taxing authorities of the Netherlands fifteen percent of the
declared dividend, as required by law.
2
Compaq reported a short-term capital loss ($20,652,816) from the
purchase and resale of the ADRs on its 1992 federal income tax re-
turn.23 Compaq also reported dividend income ($22,546,800) and,
most importantly, claimed a foreign tax credit ($3,382,050) as a result
24of the transaction.
II. TRADITIONAL SHAM TRANSACTION ANALYSIS
Americans have never found great fulfillment in paying taxes.2
Consequently, they seek to minimize their tax liability by carefully
structuring their personal and business dealings to take full advantage
of the benefits available in the tax laws. The courts have recognized
this fact and acknowledged the legality of such efforts for more than
26sixty years. Judge Learned Hand commented on this principle:
2 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id.
See generally CHARLES ADAMS, THOSE DIRTY ROTLEN TAXES: THE TAX REVOLTS
THAT BUILT AMERICA (1998) (describing a number of revolts staged by Americans in
response to various taxes). The distaste for paying taxes is not unique to America,
however, and existed long before the country declared its independence from England
in 1776. See, e.g., ADAMS, supra, at 30-31 (discussing the effect of disfavored taxes in
Great Britain, Spain, the Netherlands, and France); SHELLEY L. DAVIS, UNBRIDLED
POWER: INSIDE THE SECRET CULTURE OF THE IRS 19 (1997) ("[T]ax collectors have
never been popular, not in the days of the pharaohs, not during the reign of the Cae-
sars, nor during Charlemagne's time, or Napoleon's, or, for that matter, Sa-
vonarola's."). In the Bible, for example, tax collectors are categorized with prostitutes
and sinners. See Matthew 9:10 ("And as he sat at table in [Matthew's] house, behold,
many tax collectors and sinners came and sat down with Jesus and his disciples."); id.
21:31 ("Jesus said to them, 'Truly, I say to you, the tax collectors and the harlots go
into the kingdom of God before you.'").
26 See, e.g., Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 580 (1978) ("The fact
that favorable tax consequences were taken into account by [the taxpayer] on entering
into the transaction is no reason for disallowing those consequences. We cannot ig-
nore the reality that the tax laws affect the shape of nearly every business transac-
tion."); Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935) ("The legal right of a taxpayer
to decrease the amount of what otherwise would be his taxes, or altogether avoid them,
by means which the law permits, cannot be doubted."); Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d
809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934) ("Any one may so arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be as
low as possible; he is not bound to choose that pattern which will best pay the Treas-
ury; there is not even a patriotic duty to increase one's taxes."), affd, 293 U.S. 465
(1935); ACM P'ship v. Comm'r, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 2189, 2215 (1997) ("We do not sug-
gest that a taxpayer refrain from using the tax laws to the taxpayer's advantage."), affd
in part, rev'd in part, 157 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1017 (1999);
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Over and over again courts have said that there is nothing sinister in so
arranging one's affairs as to keep taxes as low as possible. Everybody
does so, rich or poor, and all do right, for nobody owes any public duty
to pay more than the law demands: taxes are enforced exactions, not
voluntary contributions. To demand more in the name of morals is
27
mere cant.
That is not to imply, however, that everything that taxpayers do
must be accepted by the Commissioner and the courts when applying
the tax laws.* Over the years, several related judicial doctrines have
arisen that limit taxpayers' ability to successfully engage in certain tax
avoidance transactions. Principal among these is the sham transaction
doctrine, which comprises both the economic substance and business
purpose doctrines.
It is a well accepted principle that application of the tax laws de-
pends on the substance of a transaction and not its form.2 To look
only at form would be to "exalt artifice above reality and to deprive
the statutory provision in question of all serious purpose."30 Further-
more, it would hinder the "effective administration of the tax policies
of Congress."3
The Commissioner is therefore generally free to examine the sub-
stance of a transaction and then decide that either the transaction's
Rice's Toyota World, Inc. v. Comm'r, 81 T.C. 184, 196 (1983) ("Taxpayers are gener-
ally free to structure their business transactions as they please, though motivated by tax
avoidance.. . ."), affd in part, rev'd in part, 752 F.2d 89 (4th Cir. 1985).
27 Comm'rv. Newman, 159 F.2d 848,850-51 (2d Cir. 1947) (HandJ, dissenting).
L See Saviano v. Comm'r, 765 F.2d 643, 654 (7th Cir. 1985) ("The freedom to ar-
range one's affairs to minimize taxes does not include the right to engage in financial
fantasies with the expectation that the Internal Revenue Service and the courts will
play along.").
See, e~g., Comm'r v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331, 334 (1945) ("The inci-
dence of taxation depends upon the substance of a transaction."); Helvering v. F. & R.
Lazarus & Co., 308 U.S. 252, 255 (1939) ("In the field of taxation, administrators of
the laws, and the courts, are concerned with substance and realities, and formal written
documents are not rigidly binding."); Gregory, 293 U.S. at 470 (disallowing the tax
benefits arising from a transaction because "[t]he whole undertaking, though con-
ducted according to the terms of [the Internal Revenue Code), was in fact an elabo-
rate and devious form of conveyance masquerading as a corporate reorganization, and
nothing else"); Saviano, 765 F.2d at 654 ("The Commissioner and the courts are em-
powered, and in fact duty-bound, to look beyond the contrived forms of transactions to
their economic substance and to apply the tax laws accordingly."); Comm'r v. Ashland
Oil & Refining Co., 99 F.2d 588, 591 (6th Cir. 1938) ("[T]axation is an intensely prac-
tical matter, and.., the substance of the thing done and not the form it took must
govern.").
Gregory, 293 U.S. at 470; see also Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473, 477-78 (1940)
("To hold otherwise would permit the schemes of taxpayers to supersede legislation in
the determination of the time and manner of taxation.").
31 Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. at 334.
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form should be respected because it reflects its substance, or the form
should be disregarded because it does not reflect the substance of the
32transaction. A transaction may be disregarded for tax purposes if it is
a sham transactionss There exists, however, ambiguity as to what ex-
actly it means for a transaction to be a sham. Some court decisions
include in their definition transactions that never actually occurred,
transactions that had no economic substance, and transactions that
had no business purpose, while other decisions distinguish among1 4
these categories. Regardless of the label attached, the result is that
transactions falling within any of these categories will not be recog-
nized for tax purposes.
For purposes of this Comment, transactions that never actually
occurred will be referred to as "factual shams." Little discussion is
necessary to explain why factual shams are not recognized. The tax
laws do not permit taxpayers to realize tax benefits without actually
engaging in the transactions that give rise to them.35 It is irrelevant
that Congress has provided tax benefits for similar, but real, transac-
tions. 6 Allowing tax benefits to accrue from factual shams would cre-
ate a much greater potential for abuse because the taxpayer has "[t] he
32 See Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. at 477 ("The Government may look at actualities
and upon determination that the form employed for doing business or carrying out
the challenged tax event is unreal or a sham may sustain or disregard the effect of the
fiction as best serves the purposes of the tax statute."); Spector v. Comm'r, 641 F.2d
376, 381 (5th Cir. Unit A Apr. 1981) ("Just as the Commissioner in determining in-
come tax liabilities may look through the form of a transaction to its substance, so, as a
general nile, may he bind a taxpayer to the form in which the taxpayer has cast a
transaction." (citations omitted)).
33 See United States v. Wexler, 31 F.3d 117, 122 (3d Cir. 1994) (noting the general
rule that a sham transaction is ignored for federal tax purposes); Lerman v. Comm'r,
939 F.2d 44, 45 (3d Cir. 1991) (finding that a sham transaction "is not recognized for
federal taxation purposes").
See Sochin v. Comm'r, 843 F.2d 351, 352-54 (9th Cir. 1988) (identifying business
purpose and economic substance as factors to be considered in determining whether a
transaction is a factual sham); Yosha v. Comm'r, 861 F.2d 494, 500 (7th Cir. 1988) (dis-
tinguishing between two types of shams: those where there were no transactions, and
those where the transactions really occurred but had no economic substance); Rice's
Toyota World, Inc. v. Comm'r, 81 T.C. 184, 200 (1983) (noting that some "courts re-
serve the term 'sham' for a more narrow situation in which the transaction used by the
taxpayer is, for example, merely a paper transaction or a 'fake' transmission of
money"), affd in part, rev'd in par, 752 F.2d 89 (4th Cir. 1985).
35 See Enrici v. Comm'r, 813 F.2d 293, 296 (9th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (disallow-
ing claimed tax benefits because "the parties were merely rigging paper prices, losses,
and ains to effectuate a sale of generated tax losses").
36 See id. ("The fact that Congress may have permitted similar tax advantages to be
obtained from real commodities straddles does not make the losses from these sham
transactions deductible.").
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absolute power to manipulate and dictate the price and timing of the
artificial transactions, [resulting in] larger and surer tax advantages
with much less economic risk" for the taxpayer than if he entered into
real transactions.s
From a doctrinal standpoint, concentrating on what will be re-
ferred to as "economic sham" transactions is more interesting. Eco-
nomic sham analysis is primarily concerned with ascertaining
"whether the transaction had any practical economic effects other
than the creation of income tax losses."3 The Supreme Court has
stated that a transaction should be respected for tax purposes when
there is "a genuine multiple-party transaction with economic sub-
stance which is compelled or encouraged by business or regulatory re-
alities, is imbued with tax-independent considerations, and is not
shaped solely by tax-avoidance features that have meaningless labels
attached."", Courts typically focus on two factors in determining
whether a transaction is an economic sham: (1) whether the transac-
tion had economic substance beyond the production of tax benefits
(an objective analysis), and (2) whether there was a nontax business
purpose (a subjective analysis) .4 "However, these distinct aspects of
the economic sham inquiry do not constitute discrete prongs of a
'rigid two-step analysis,' but rather represent related factors both of
which inform the analysis of whether the transaction had sufficient
substance, apart from its tax consequences, to be respected for tax
purposes."4' The fact that a transaction lacks a business purpose, or
alternatively, lacks economic substance, is not conclusive evidence of a
sham transaction.f
3 Id.
Sochin, 843 F.2d at 354.
Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 583-84 (1978).
See ACM P'ship v. Comm'r, 157 F.3d 231, 247 (3d Cir. 1998) (stating that
whether a transaction is an economic sham depends on both a subjective test and an
objective test), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1017 (1999); Sochin, 843 F.2d at 354 (noting that
courts typically focus on whether a transaction had a nontax business purpose and
economic substance to determine if it is a sham); Rice's Toyota World, Inc. v. Comm'r,
752 F.2d 89, 91 (4th Cir. 1985) ("To treat a transaction as a sham, the court must find
that the taxpayer was motivated by no business purposes other than obtaining tax
benefits in entering the transaction, and that the transaction had no economic sub-
stance ... .")
41 ACM PShip, 157 F.3d at 247; see also Sochin, 843 F.2d at 354 ("[W]e did not in-
tend our decision in Bail Bonds to outline a rigid two-step analysis. Instead, the consid-
eration of business purpose and economic substance are simply more precise factors to
consider in the application of this court's traditional sham analysis .... .").
42 See Packard v. Comm'r, 85 T.C. 397, 417 (1985) ("A taxpayer's failure to estab-
lish that a transaction was motivated by a business purpose rather than by tax avoid-
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A. Economic Substance Doctrine
The economic substance doctrine seeks to objectively determine if
a transaction possessed any real, nontax economic benefit.41 In mak-
ing this decision, the doctrine only requires that the transaction be
one "that some people enter into without a tax motive, even though
the people fighting to defend the tax advantages of the transaction
might not or would not have undertaken it but for the prospect of
such advantages-may indeed have had no other interest in the trans-
action."4 In evaluating a transaction for economic substance, the
courts have frequently concentrated on whether the transaction had a
reasonable possibility of profit without considering its tax benefits.45
Another important related consideration is whether the taxpayer was
exposed to any economic risk by engaging in the transaction.0 When
ance is not conclusive ... that the transaction was a sham. Rather, if ... a reasonable
possibility of profit existed apart from tax benefits, the transaction will not be classified
as a sham."); Rice's Toyota World, Inc. v. Comm'r, 81 T.C. 184, 203 n.17 (1983)
("Once business purpose is established, the transaction should not be classified a
'sham.' A finding of no business purpose, however, is not conclusive evidence of a
sham transaction. The transaction will still be valid if it possesses some modicum of
economic substance."), affd inpart, rev'd in part, 752 F.2d 89 (4th Cir. 1985).
43 See ACM P'Ship, 157 F.3d at 248 ("In assessing the economic substance of a tax-
payer's transactions, the courts have examined 'whether the transaction has any practi-
cal economic effects other than the creation of income tax losses'...." (quotingJacob-
son v. Comm'r, 915 F.2d 832, 837 (2d Cir. 1990)); Sochin, 843 F.2d at 354 (articulating
the objective analysis as whether "the transaction had 'economic substance' beyond the
generation of tax benefits"); Rice's Toyota World, Inc., 752 F.2d at 94 (stating that the
economic substance inquiry is an objective inquiry into whether the transaction pro-
duced any nontax benefit).
4Yosha v. Comm'r, 861 F.2d 494, 499 (7th Cir. 1988); see also Rice's Toyota World,
Inc., 752 F.2d at 96 ("[T]he court may not ignore transactions that have economic sub-
stance even if the motive for the transaction is to avoid taxes.").
45 See, e.g., Rice's Toyota World, Inc., 752 F.2d at 94 ("[T]he economic substance in-
quiry... requires an objective determination of whether a reasonable possibility of
profit from the transaction existed apart from tax benefits."); Sheldon v. Comm'r, 94
T.C. 738, 759 (1990) (noting that "where transactions are analyzed regarding their
economic substance, the focus is upon profit objective or the potential for profit");
Packard, 85 T.C. at 417 ("[I]f an objective analysis of the transaction indicates that a
reasonable possibility of profit existed apart from tax benefits, the transaction will not
be classified as a sham.").
See Yosha, 861 F.2d at 500 (stating that transactions that do not involve market
risk are not economically substantial transactions); Fender v. United States, 577 F.2d
934, 936 (5th Cir. 1978) (stating that whether the taxpayers were entitled to a loss de-
duction depended on whether they faced "a real risk of not being able to ... recover
the apparent loss" arising from the transaction); Heltzer v. Comm'r, 62 T.C.M. (CCH)
518, 529 (1991) ("Commodity trading lacks economic substance where it is virtually
risk-free....").
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appropriate, the courts have considered other factors, such as the rea-
sonableness of the sales price and adherence to contractual terms.
47
1. Profit Potential
a. Generally
On numerous occasions courts have declared transactions to be
shams because they lacked a possibility for profit.4 8 In Sheldon v. Com-
missioner,"I involving the simultaneous purchase of Treasury Bills ("T-
Bills") and the entrance into repurchase agreements ("repos") for
those T-Bills,5" the court stated that the partnership did not have "any
potential for future profit" because it was obligated to pay higher rates of
interest under the repos than it received on the T-Bills.5' Further-
more, although some of the repos to maturity did not have this char-
47 See Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 582-83 (1978) (listing a num-
ber of factors that the Court felt were meaningful in determining the "substance and
economic realities of the transaction"); Bealor v. Comm'r, 72 T.C.M. (CCH) 730, 766
(1996) (same); Arrowhead Mountain Getaway, Ltd. v. Comm'r, 69 T.C.M. (CCH)
1805, 1817 (1995) (same), affid mem., 119 F.3d 5 (9th Cir. 1997); Levy v. Comm'r, 91
T.C. 838, 856 (1988) (same); Rose v. Comm'r, 88 T.C. 386, 410-11 (1987) (same), affd,
868 F.2d 851 (6th Cir. 1989).
4K See, e.g., Rice's Toyota World, Inc., 752 F.2d at 94-95 (finding that a transaction
lacked economic substance because the residual value of the equipment involved in
the transaction "was not sufficient to earn [the taxpayer] a profit"); Glass v. Comm'r,
87 T.C. 1087, 1157 (1986) (describing an option straddle transaction that was found to
lack economic substance as having produced a loss in year one and a gain in year two
that was approximately equal to the year one loss), affd sub nom. Herrington v.
Comm'r, 854 F.2d 755 (5th Cir. 1988), Yosha v. Comm'r, 861 F.2d 494 (7th Cir. 1988),
Ratliffv. Comm'r, 865 F.2d 97 (6th Cir. 1989), Kirchman v. Comm'r, 862 F.2d 1486
(11th Cir. 1989), Keane v. Comm'r, 865 F.2d 1088 (9th Cir. 1989), Killingsworth v.
Comm'r, 864 F.2d 1214 (5th Cir. 1989), Friedman v. Comm'r, 869 F.2d 785 (4th Cir.
1989), Dewees v. Comm'r, 870 F.2d 21 (1st Cir. 1989), Kielmar v. Comm'r, 884 F.2d
959 (7th Cir. 1989), Lee v. Comm'r, 897 F.2d 915 (8th Cir. 1989), Bohrer v. Comn'r,
945 F.2d 344 (10th Cir. 1991); Aiken Indus., Inc. v. Comm'r, 56 T.C. 925, 934 (1971)
(declaring a transaction to lack economic substance because it produced "the same
inflow and outflow of funds").
49 94 T.C. 738 (1990).
5o In a repo, a seller of a security (a funds borrower) transfers the security to a
buyer (a funds lender) under an arrangement whereby the securities seller agrees
to repurchase the security on a specified date (often the next day) at a specified
price, and the securities buyer agrees to resell the security back to the seller. From
the perspective of the buyer, the transaction is a reverse repurchase agreement
(reverse repo). Repos serve the function of secured borrowings and loans, al-
though they are denominated as sales and resales.
Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Beyond Negotiability: A New Model for Transfer and Pledge of Inter-
ests in Securities Controlled by Intermediaries, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 305, 324 n.51 (1990).
51 Sheldon, 94 T.C. at 763.
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acteristic (that is, they were marginally profitable), economic sub-
stance was still lacking because they served merely to reduce the al-
ready established losses resulting from the prior repos.5'
The amount of profit potential that a transaction must have in or-
der to possess economic substance is an unsettled question. Some
court opinions contain language indicating that any profit potential is
sufficient.5' Other opinions require the profit potential to be more
than nominal.5 There are also numerous cases that compare the
profit potential to the tax benefits generated by the transaction, al-
though no specific threshold ratio is mentoned.5 Much of the uncer-
tainty as to the amount of profit and the profit/tax benefit ratio nec-
essary for a transaction to be deemed to possess economic substance is
due to the fact that the cases tend to fall at the extremes, with the
transaction either lacking any possibility of profit,56 or requiring sig-
52 Id.
53 See ACM P'ship v. Comm'r, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 2189, 2217 (1997) (holding that
economic substance "will not be found unless there was a reasonable expectation that
the nontax benefits would be at least commensurate with the transaction costs"), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part; 157 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1017 (1999);
Rice's Toyota World, Inc. v. Comm'r, 81 T.C. 184, 207 (1983) ("As shown by the finan-
cial calculations and using even the most optimistic forecasts, the transaction in the
case before us could not prove profitable."), af'd in part, rev'd in part, 752 F.2d 89 (4th
Cir. 1985); Aiken Indus., Inc., 56 T.C. at 934 (stating that a transaction lacked economic
substance where a corporation "obtained exactly what it gave up in a dollar-for-dollar
exchange. Thus, it was committed to pay out exactly what it collected, and it made no
profit on the [transaction]....").
See Sheldon, 94 T.C. at 767 (acknowledging that a few of the transactions had a
small potential for gain, but dismissing the amounts as "nominal" and "relatively insig-
nificant"); Estate of Thomas v. Comm'r, 84 T.C. 412, 440 n.52 (1985) ("Since the po-
tential profit here was more than de minimis, we are satisfied that [the taxpayers]
should prevail.").
55 See, e.g., Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361, 366 (1960) (noting that the tax-
payer incurred a net cash outflow of over $90,000 by borrowing money at a higher rate
than the purchased annuity paid, but sought a tax reduction of over $230,000);
Sheldon, 94 T.C. at 768 ("The potential for 'gain' here ... is infinitesimally nominal
and vastly insignificant when considered in comparison with the claimed deduc-
tions."); Glass v. Comm'r, 87 T.C. 1087, 1157 (1986) ("While the tax losses anticipated
were very substantial, the economic gains, if any, and losses were, by comparison, very
small."), aff'd sub nom. Herrington v. Comm'r, 854 F.2d 755 (5th Cir. 1988), Yosha v.
Comm'r, 861 F.2d 494 (7th Cir. 1988), Ratliffv. Comm'r, 865 F.2d 97 (6th Cir. 1989),
Kirchman v. Comm'r, 862 F.2d 1486 (11th Cir. 1989), Keane v. Comm'r, 865 F.2d 1088
(9th Cir. 1989), Killingsworth v. Comm'r, 864 F.2d 1214 (5th Cir. 1989), Friedman v.
Comm'r, 869 F.2d 785 (4th Cir. 1989), Dewees v. Comm'r, 870 F.2d 21 (1st Cir. 1989),
Kielmar v. Comm'r, 884 F.2d 959 (7th Cir. 1989), Lee v. Comm'r, 897 F.2d 915 (8th
Cir. 1989), Bohrerv. Comm'r, 945 F.2d 344 (10th Cir. 1991).
See, e.g., Rice's Toyota World, Inc., 81 T.C. at 205-06 (reviewing calculations that
showed, when ignoring tax benefits, that the taxpayer could not recover his initial in-
vestment in the transaction).
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nificantly more cash expenditures than tax benefits generated.57 It is
unlikely that the courts will set more specific standards until they are
presented with closer cases.
b. Discounted Value
In Hilton v. Commissioner,"8 the Tax Court-having already deter-
mined that the projections of the taxpayer's expert were "fatally defec-
tive"-stated in dicta that profit potential should be determined on a
discounted, or present value,5" basis. When the Ninth Circuit af-
firmed Hilton, however, it disavowed the discounted value approach,
fearing it was a dangerous step toward requiring a minimum rate of
return." The Tax Court also distanced itself from its Hilton decision
in a subsequent case in which, although the parties had not raised the
issue, it refused to use the discounted value approach.6 The court
addressed:
whether, in determining the economic viability of the instant transac-
tion, we are required to discount the expected residual value of the
equipment back to 1975 dollars. In the absence of statutory mandate,
we decline to do so. While we are aware of our footnote 23 in Hilton, we
note that the method employed therein was dictum in the context of cir-
cumstances bordering on the egregious.
Moreover, we do not feel competent, in the absence of legislative
guidance, to require that a particular return must be expected before a
"profit" is recognizable, the necessary conclusion to be drawn if we were
A7 See, e.g., Lemmen v. Comm'r, 77 T.C. 1326, 1345-46 (1981) (noting that the tax-
payer could realize a net tax savings of only $27,847 in exchange for a cash outlay of
$51,594).
74 T.C. 305 (1980), affdpercuriam, 671 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1982).
Determining profit on a present value basis takes into account the time value of
money. The general idea is that $1 received today is worth more than $1 received a
year from now because the $1 received today can be invested and can earn a return.
See CHARLES T. HORNGREN ET AL., COST ACCOUNTNG: A MANAGERIAL EMPHASIS 750
(10th ed. 2000) (defining "time value of money"). For example, if Ronald receives
$100 on January 1, 2000, he can invest that amount in T-Bills that pay, let us assume,
6% interest. OnJanuary 1, 2001, Ronald will have $106-his original $100 plus $6 in
interest. This logic works in both directions. For example, if Molly has the opportu-
nit)' to purchase an investment that will pay her $500 on January 1, 2001, she will only
be willing to pay approximately $472 for that investment on January 1, 2000, again as-
suming that her next best use of the money is to purchase T-Bills that pay 6% interest.
IT Hilton, 74 T.C. at 353 & n.23.
W See Hilton v. Comm'r, 671 F.2d 316, 317 (9th Cir. 1982) (per curiam) ("We
deem the.., rate [used by the Tax Court to discount to present value] to be for illus-
trative purposes only. No suggestion of a minimum required rate of return is made.").
62 Estate of Thomas v. Comm'r, 84 T.C. 412, 440 n.52 (1985).
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to discount residual value.... Our sole task here is to determine
whether a profit was reasonably likely on these facts in order to find that
tax avoidance was not the sole motivation for the transaction. Since the
potential profit here was more than de minimis, we are satisfied that pe-
63titioners should prevail.
Despite the language in Estate of Thomas, by 1997 the Tax Court
had apparently renewed its belief in the discounted value approach
when it declared that "[the taxpayer] could not have achieved a non-
negative net present value under any reasonable forecast of future in-
terest rates."" The Third Circuit also embraced the discounted value
approach when it affirmed the ACM Partnership decision:
In transactions that are designed to yield deferred rather than immedi-
ate returns, present value adjustments are, as the courts have recognized,
an appropriate means of assessing the transaction's actual and antici-
pated economic effects.
We find no basis in the law for precluding a tax court's reliance on a
present value adjustment where such an adjustment, under the sur-
rounding circumstances, will serve as an accurate gauge of the reasona-
bly expected economic consequences of the transaction.65
In light of this decision, the courts are apparently willing to con-
sider application of the discounted value approach, at least when do-
ing so does not distort economic reality.
In conclusion, a transaction that is unprofitable before consider-
ing any of its tax benefits, whether or not a discounted value approach
is used, will generally be determined to lack economic substance.
2. Economic Risk
The amount of economic risk inherent in a transaction is a con-
cept closely related to the transaction's profit potential. A transaction
that does not expose the taxpayer to any economic risk-that has
"zero prospect of gain or loss"6--is therefore not seen as having eco-
63 Id. (citations omitted).
6A ACM P'ship v. Comm'r, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 2189, 2219 (1997), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part, 157 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1017 (1999).
rZ ACMP'ship, 157 F.3d at 259 (citations omitted). For a further discussion of ACM
Partnership, see Steven M. Surdell, ACM Partnership-A New Test for Corporate Tax Shel-
ters, 75 TAx NoTES 1377 (1997); Jennifer D. Avitabile, Note, Corporate Tax Shelter
Lacked Economic Substance: ACM Partnership v. Commissioner, 51 TAX LAW. 385
(1998).
66 Yosha v. Comm'r, 861 F.2d 494, 501 (7th Cir. 1988).
COMBATING CORPORATE TAX SHELTERS
nomic substance. 7
[T]he courts have applied the economic substance doctrine ... to disre-
gard transactions which, although involving actual transactions disposing
of property at a loss, had no net economic effect on the taxpayer's eco-
nomic position, either because the taxpayer retained the opportunity to
reacquire the property at the same price, or because the taxpayer offset
the economic effect of the disposition by acquiring assets virtually iden-
tical to those relinquished6
For example, in Fender v. United States, the Fifth Circuit disallowed
deductions for a loss that the taxpayers incurred on a bond sale. 9 The
unrated bonds were sold at a substantial loss to a bank that was ap-
proximately forty-one percent owned by the taxpayers.70 Although in-
creased interest rates had caused the bonds' market value to decrease
since the taxpayers had purchased them, the issuer was financially
sound and capable of fulfilling its obligations relating to the bonds.7'
A little more than a month after the sale, and in a new tax year, the
taxpayers repurchased the bonds for roughly the same price for which
72they had sold the bonds. In examining the transaction, the court
considered "whether the taxpayers were exposed to a real risk of not
being able to repurchase the bonds in a short period of time and thus
of not being able to recover the apparent loss from the ... sale to the
bank."73 The court determined that the taxpayers had sufficient con-
trol over the bank to ensure that the bonds would be resold to them.74
Furthermore, the unrated nature of the bonds limited their market-
ability greatly and would have made it difficult for the bank to sell
them to anyone but the taxpayers. While the initial sale created a
genuine loss, the loss was effectively canceled by the subsequent re-
67 See id. at 500 ("Straddles that involve no market risks are not economically sub-
stantial straddles and hedges; they are artifices created by accomplices in tax evasion,
the brokers."); Heltzer v. Comm'r, 62 T.C.M. (CCH) 518, 529 (1991) ("Commodity
trading lacks economic substance where it is virtually risk-free ... ."); see also Sochin v.
Comm'r, 843 F.2d 351, 356 (9th Cir. 1988) ("[N]o reasonable investor would surren-
der total control of his or her ability to profit or lose unless satisfied that the risk of loss
had been greatly diminished or eliminated.").
ACM P'ship, 157 F.3d at 249 (citations omitted).
577 F.2d 934,938 (5th Cir. 1978).
Id. at 935-36.
71 Id. at936.
72 Id. at 935-36.
I7 d. at 936.
74 Id. at 937.
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purchase. The net nontax cash effect of the transactions was zero dol-
lars.75
3. Other Factors
In certain cases, particularly those involving sale-and-leaseback
transactions, the courts have considered several other factors in de-
termining whether a transaction exhibited economic substance.
Some of these factors include: (1) the presence or absence of arm's-
length price negotiations; (2) the relationship between the sales price
and the fair market value; (3) the structure of the financing; (4) the
degree of adherence to contractual terms; and (5) the reasonableness
of income and residual value projections.6 For example, the taxpay-
ers in Rose v. Commzsswner purchased art masters7s that, according to
the seller's marketing materials, provided certain tax advantages:
[A] purchaser is entitled to a 10% investment tax credit and accelerated
depreciation deductions based on the entire purchase price of the art
master. A purchaser who properly elects the accrual method of account-
ing for his trade or business of exploiting the art master is also entitled
to currently accrue interest deductions on his notes, including the par-
tial recourse note, and a cash basis taxpayer is entitled to a deduction for
interest when actually paid. The investment credit available to the pur-
chaser of an art master is not affected by the "at risk" limitation con-
tained in the Code; however, losses incurred in the venture are subject
to that limitation. A cash payment made by a purchaser, and all notes as
to which the purchaser is personally liable, including the recourse por-
tion of the partial recourse note, qualify as amounts at risk. Accordingly,
purchasers of art masters will be allowed to deduct losses up to the total
7. See id. at 936 ("Although the [taxpayers] appeared to sustain a significant loss by
transferring the bonds to the bank .... the ability to repurchase these bonds meant
that the [taxpayers] would eventually be paid their original investment in the bonds
and would suffer no real loss from the sale.").
76 See Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 582-83 (1978) (listing a num-
ber of factors that the Court felt were meaningful in determining the "substance and
economic realities of the transaction"); Bealor v. Comm'r, 72 T.C.M. (CCH) 730, 766
(1996) (same); Arrowhead Mountain Getaway, Ltd. v. Comm'r, 69 T.C.M. (CCH)
1805, 1817 (1995) (same), affd mem, 119 F.3d 5 (9th Cir. 1997); Levy v. Comm'r, 91
T.C. 838, 856 (1988) (same); Rose v. Comm'r, 88 T.C. 386, 410-11 (1987) (same), affd,
868 F.2d 851 (6th Cir. 1989).
77 88 T.C. 386 (1987).
78 An art master consisted of "silkscreen mylars, lithographic plates and mylars, or
photoscreen negatives of an original work of art, together with related copyrights,"
which permitted the purchaser to produce products such as posters, greeting cards,
and ceramics bearing the image of the original work of art. Id. at 390.
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of those amounts.7
The taxpayers made no effort to inquire about the masters' true
value, did not negotiate with the seller, and paid over $500,000 for
each master even though, at the time, the fair market values of the
masters were negligible.8 ° Furthermore, the taxpayers financed their
purchases with partial recourse notes, with the recourse portion ap-
proximately equal in value to the tax deductions the taxpayers antici-
pated they would take during the first two years of their investment."'
The nonrecourse portion of the debt was judged by the court as un-
likely to be repaid because insufficient revenue would be generated by
the investment.82 Based on these findings, the court held that the
transaction lacked economic substance.3
In contrast to Rose is the case of Levy v. Commissioner, in which the
taxpayers engaged in a purchase-and-leaseback of computer equip-
ment."' Relying on the same factors considered in Rose,8'5 the court
held that the transactions possessed economic substance." The court
determined that the purchase price paid by the taxpayers was reason-
able and "resulted from arm's-length price negotiations" between un-
related parties."7 In addition, cash and recourse debt obligations with
commercially reasonable interest rates financed the purchase. Finally,
all payments required under the various promissory notes and lease
agreements were made, and the court determined that all parties to
the transaction intended to enforce the promissory notes and lease
agreements according to their terms.
4. Summary
In its simplest terms, the economic substance doctrine examines
the nontax economic benefits of a transaction. If the transaction is
reasonably expected to be profitable, exposes the taxpayer to eco-
nomic risk, or consists of other factors such as arm's-length price ne-
gotiations, then it is said to possess economic substance. Conversely, if
Id. at 390-91.
Id. at 415-18.
'1 Id. at 419-20.
Id. at 420.
. Id. at 405.
' 91 T.C. 838, 840 (1988).
See supra note 76 and accompanying text (listing factors used to determine the
economic substance of sale-and-leaseback transactions).
Levy, 91 T.C. at 853-59.
h7 Id. at 859.
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the transaction lacks these traits, it is deemed to be without economic
substance.
B. Business Purpose Doctrine
The business purpose doctrine is a subjective inquiry concerned
with a taxpayer's motives for entering a transacdon.ss The courts have
set forth different formulations of the subjective test.8 The common
theme of these expressions, however, is an inquiry into whether the
transaction had a business purpose other than obtaining tax benefits.
The business purpose doctrine originated in Grego7y v. Helvering."
Mrs. Gregory was the sole stockholder of United Mortgage, which
owned one thousand shares of stock in Monitor Securities ("Moni-
tor") .91
For the sole purpose of procuring a transfer of these shares to herself in
order to sell them for her individual profit, and, at the same time, dimin-
ish the amount of income tax which would result from a direct transfer
by way of dividend, she sought to bring about a "reorganization" under
[the federal tax laws]. 9
United Mortgage transferred the Monitor stock to Averill, a newly
formed corporation.3 Three days later, Averill was dissolved and liq-
uidated by the transfer of the Monitor stock to Mrs. Gregory, who
immediately sold it.94 The Court held that the formation of Averill,
the transfer of Monitor stock to it, and its subsequent liquidation, was
an "operation having no business or corporate purpose."9 Averill ex-
isted solely to serve as a conduit to transfer Monitor shares to Mrs.
Packard v. Comm'r, 85 T.G. 397, 417 (1985).
89 See, e.g., ACM P'ship v. Comm'r, 157 F.3d 231, 253 (3d Cir. 1998) (asking
whether the transaction was intended to serve any "useful non-tax purpose"), cert. de-
nied, 526 U.S. 1017 (1999); Rice's Toyota World, Inc. v. Comm'r, 752 F.2d 89, 91 (4th
Cir. 1985) (questioning whether "the taxpayer was motivated by no business purpose
other than obtaining tax benefits in entering in the transaction"); see also Yosha v.
Comm'r, 861 F.2d 494, 501-02 (7th Cir. 1988) ("Judges can't peer into people's minds
or 'weigh' motives.... Rather, the usual approach is to focus the analysis on whether
any non-tax goals or functions were or plausibly could have been served by the ac-
tion.").
90 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935).
91 Id. at 467.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 469.
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Gregory, so that she could avoid some taxes, after which point Averill
"immediately was put to death."6
In contrast, in Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, the corporate
taxpayer sought "to have the gain on sales of its real property treated
as the gain of its sole stockholder and its corporate existence ignored
as merely fictitious."97 The corporate taxpayer had originally been
created for the stockholder's benefit, had existed for several years
prior to the transaction at issue, and had engaged in business transac-
tions both before and after the one at issue.9 The Supreme Court
stated that in like cases, where the stockholder "adopt[s] the corpo-
rate form for purposes of his own[, t]he choice of the advantages of
incorporation to do business... require[s] the acceptance of the tax
disadvantages. "" Furthermore, "in matters relating to the revenue,
the corporate form may be disregarded where it is a sham or unreal,"
although it must be respected when there is a business purpose for
the form that "is the equivalent of business activity or is followed by
the carrying on of business by the corporation. "'00
A court's analysis of a taxpayer's alleged business purpose will of-
ten focus on whether the taxpayer "approached the decision to enter
into [the] transaction in a businesslike manner." 1 Numerous factors
may be considered in making this determination. Some of the factors
are: (1) the taxpayer's normal behavior when entering into a transac-
tion for profit; (2) the taxpayer's principal line of business and
whether it had previously been involved in transactions of the type at
issue; (3) the extensiveness of the taxpayer's investigation into the
merits of the transaction; (4) whether cash flow analyses were pre-
pared that included the components of the transaction crucial to it
earning a profit; (5) whether the significance of, and the risks associ-
ated with, these components were discussed; (6) whether an investiga-
tion was conducted to determine the business reputation and finan-
cial status of the other parties to the transaction; and (7) the extent to
which the taxpayer focused on the tax benefits of the transaction in
discussions with its advisors.
6 Id. at 470.
-,7 319 U.S. 436,436 (1943).
Id. at 439-40.
Id. at 439.
Id. (citations omitted).
Levv. Comm'r, 91 T.C. 838, 855 (1988).
V,, See Casebeer v. Comm'r, 909 F.2d 1360, 1364 (9th Cir. 1990) (listing several fac-
tors that might be considered in "evaluating the taxpayers' business purpose"); Levy, 91
T.C. at 855-56 (same); Rice's Toyota World, Inc. v. Comm'r, 81 T.C. 184, 202 (1983)
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A review of the cases reveals that taxpayers have asserted a wide
variety of business purposes. For example, one case involved a claim
by a taxpayer that its business purpose for affiliating with a holding
company was its fear of being held liable for one of the holding com-
pany's obligations and its concern over the adverse effect that a law-
suit would have on its credit standing.103 The court ultimately rejected
the taxpayer's argument because it detennined that the fear was
groundless and "[a]ction motivated by a groundless fear cannot be
considered motivated by a business purpose."0 4 Other examples of
possible business purposes are diversification' °5 and financing re-
quirements.
10 6
Perhaps the most common business purpose asserted, however,
simply involves an inquiry into whether the taxpayer was profit-
motivated.107 In Goldstein v. Commissioner, the taxpayer, after winning
the Irish Sweepstakes, borrowed a large amount of money at an inter-
est rate of 4%.' 08 The taxpayer used the borrowed funds to purchase
Treasury notes that paid annual interest of 1.5% or less, and pledged
the notes as collateral for the bank loans.'o The taxpayer then pre-
paid a significant amount of interest on the loans, hoping to claim an
interest deduction that would shelter much of her Sweepstakes win-
nings from taxation." ° After reviewing the transaction, the court disal-
(same), affid in part, rev'd inpar4 752 F.2d 89 (4th Cir. 1985).
103 See David's Specialty Shops, Inc. v. Johnson, 131 F. Supp. 458, 460 (S.D.N.Y.
1955) (presenting the taxpayer's alleged business purpose). From a tax perspective,
the advantage of the attempted affiliation was that, if successful, it would have permit-
ted the taxpayer to file a consolidated return with the holding company, thereby ena-
bling the taxpayer to offset the holding company's net loss (which otherwise would
have gone unused) against the taxpayer's net income. This would have reduced both
the consolidated taxable income and the resulting tax liability. See id. at 459 (discuss-
ing the tax effects of consolidation).
104 Id. at 461.
10o See Levy, 91 T.C. at 855 (concluding that the taxpayers "entered into the transac-
tion in issue for sound business reasons'-to diversify their business investments).
106 See Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 582 (1978) (noting that there
were financing requirements imposed by state and federal regulators that caused the
taxpayer to enter into the transaction).
See, e.g., Rice's Toyota World, Inc. v. Comm'r, 752 F.2d 89, 92-94 (4th Cir. 1985)
(reviewing the evidence to determine whether the taxpayer participated in the transac-
tion to make a profit); Goldstein v. Comm'r, 364 F.2d 734, 739 (2d Cir. 1966) (examin-
ing the taxpayer's claim that she engaged in the transaction expecting to realize an
economic gain from appreciation of the purchased property that would more than off-
set the unfavorable interest rate differential she incurred to purchase the property).
108 364 F.2d at 736.
109 Id. at 736.
110 Id. at 736-37.
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lowed the deduction because it did not have a business purpose."'
The evidence, consisting of computations made by the taxpayer's ad-
visor at the time she entered into the transactions, directly contra-
dicted the taxpayer's claim that she anticipated significant market ap-
preciation of the Treasury notes.112 The court stated that "a good
example of [a] purposeless activity is the borrowing of funds at 4% in
order to purchase property that returns less than 2% and holds out no
prospect of appreciation sufficient to counter the unfavorable interest
rate differential.""$
III. ANALYSIS OF THE TAX COURT'S OPINION IN COMPAQ
The Tax Court's opinion in Compaq14 closely follows the tradi-
tional sham transaction analysis-examining both economic sub-
stance and business purpose-presented in Part II.1 Of particular
emphasis in the opinion is the lack of any pretax profit potential in
the Compaq transaction'16 The court states that the Commissioner
"persuasively demonstrates that [Compaq] would incur a prearranged
economic loss from the transaction" if tax benefits are not consid-
ered."' A cash flow analysis presented by the Commissioner, and
adopted by the court, shows that the transaction resulted in a pretax
net economic loss of $1,486,755.11"
II Id. at 737.
112 Id. at 739.
1- Id. at 742; see also Yosha v. Comm'r, 861 F.2d 494, 498 (7th Cir. 1988)
("[D]eliberately to incur an expense greater than the expected gain ... is the antithe-
sis of profit-motivated behaior .... "); Sheldon v. Comm'r, 94 T.C. 738, 763 (1990)
("Tax benefits could be the only purpose behind borrowing money at 10.88-percent
interest in order to earn 10.42-percent interest.").
14 Compaq Computer Corp. v. Comm'r, 113 T.C. 214 (1999).
:15 See supra Part II (examining the sham transaction doctrine as developed by the
courts).
le See supra Part II.A.l.a (explaining that a transaction that possesses pretax profit
potential has economic substance and is therefore not a sham transaction).
17 Compaq, 113 T.C. at 222.
n Cash-flow from ADR transaction:
ADR purchase trades ($887,577,129)
ADR sale trades 868,412,129
Net cash from ADR transaction ($19,165,000)
Cash-flow from dividend:
Gross dividend 22,545,800
Netherlands withholding tax (3,381,870)
2000]
376 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVEW [Vol. 149: 355
Compaq, aware of the need to show that the ADR transaction pos-
sessed profit potential, presented its own analysis that attempted to
show that the transaction resulted in a pretax profit of $1,895,115."'
The only difference between the Commissioner's calculation and
Compaq's is that Compaq excluded the $3,381,870 representing the
Netherlands withholding tax paid on the Royal Dutch dividend. 20 In
essence, Compaq ignored a cost of the transaction-the Netherlands
withholding tax-in calculating the transaction's pretax profit because
Compaq would be able to recover that amount through the foreign
tax credit. Thus, the withholding tax did not represent a true cost.
2'
The foreign tax credit, however, cannot be considered in determining
whether a transaction had any profit potential independent of tax sav-
ings because it is a tax savings.1n As demonstrated by the Commis-
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Id. at 223.
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22,545,800
(1,485,685)
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Id. at 221.
120 See id. at 222 ("While asserting that it made a 'real' payment to the Netherlands
in the form of the... withheld tax, [Compaq] contends that that withholding tax
should be disregarded in determining ... the economic substance of the transac-
tion.").
1 See id. at 221-22 (explaining Compaq's calculation of the pretax profit on the
ADR transaction).
122 See supra note 43 and accompanying text (stating that the economic substance
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sioner's analysis, the tax reporting approach used by Compaq to show
a pretax profit-reporting the gross amount of the dividend even
though only the net amount was received-could produce an eco-
nomic gain only when the foreign tax credit was claimed.lu3
The court went on to find that Compaq did not face any real mar-
ket risks by engaging in the transaction.2 4  The twenty-three cross
trades occurred in about an hour, with each purchase and resale oc-
curring almost simultaneously, at prices predetermined by Twenty-
First, the investment firm handling Compaq's transactions. As a re-
sult, there was "virtually no risk of price fluctuation. " 25 Furthermore,
the use of special settlement terms and the large size of each trade
minimized the risk of third parties breaking up the cross trades. Fi-
nally, there was "no risk of other traders breaking up the trades" be-
cause they occurred at the market price.2 '
The Tax Court also analyzed the transaction under the business
purpose doctrine."' The court rather quickly dismissed Compaq's ar-
gument that it entered the transaction intending to make a short-term
profit."" As was already discussed, the Commissioner demonstrated
that the transaction could not possibly result in a pretax profit.29 The
court also noted that the transaction was marketed to Compaq as a
way to shelter a portion of a previously recognized capital gain and
that Compaq engaged in the multimillion dollar transaction based on
little more than a one-hour meeting with Twenty-First.Y The court's
final statement on this point is that Compaq's "evaluation of the pro-
posed transaction was less than businesslike."' 3'
doctrine is concerned with the nontax benefits, if any, of a transaction).
123 See Compaq, 113 T.C. at 223 (calculating a net economic loss, ithout consider-
ing the foreign tax credit, of $1,486,755 as a result of the ADR transaction).
124 See supra Part II.A.2 (explaining that the lack of economic risk in a transaction is
an indicator of a sham transaction).
2' Compaq, 113 T.C. at 224.
126 Id.
127See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text (noting that the courts often ex-
amine a transaction under both the economic substance and business purpose doc-
trines before determining if it is an economic sham, because the failure to satisfy one
of the tests does not constitute conclusive evidence of an economic sham).
111K See supra notes 107-13 and accompanying text (discussing profit motive as a ba-
sis to establish a valid business purpose).
I.. See supra note 118 and accompanying text (calculating a net economic loss of
$1,486,755 from the transaction).
1Y, See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text (identifying several factors the
courts will look at in analyzing a taxpayer's alleged business purpose).
131 Compaq, 113 T.C. at 224.
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The final portion of the opinion upholds the assessment of an ac-
curacy-related penalty3 2 against Compaq on the basis that Compaq
was negligent in taking the tax return position it did with respect to
the ADR transaction.'33 Compaq argued that a negligence penalty
could not be assessed "because the return position was reasonable, 
13 41
application of the economic substance doctrine to the ADR transac-
tion is 'inherently imprecise', and application of the economic sub-
stance doctrine to disregard a foreign tax credit raises an issue of first
impression."'35 The court, however, found Compaq's arguments to be
unpersuasive because the Compaq employees involved in the transac-
tion "were sophisticated professionals with investment experience and
should have been alerted to the questionable economic nature of the
ADR transaction. They, however, failed to take even the most rudi-
mentary steps to investigate the bona fide economic aspects of the
ADR transaction. """ Furthermore, anyone with even a general famili-
arity with the sham transaction doctrine could have identified the
ADR transaction as potentially abusive and deserving of a more thor-
ough review than a one-hour meeting with the transaction's promoter
and a perusal of a spreadsheet provided by the promoter.
IV. CRITIQUE OF PROPOSALS TO COMBAT CORPORATE TAX SHELTERS
Transactions like the one in Compaq Computer Corp. v. Commissioner
have prompted several groups to suggest steps that should be taken to
protect the integrity of the Internal Revenue Code ("Code")."7 Not
only do abusive corporate tax shelters wrongfully deprive the federal
132 See I.R.C. §§ 6662(a), (b) (1) (1994) (providing for a penalty equal to twenty
percent of the amount of any underpayment of tax attributable to negligence).
1 See I.R.C. § 6662(c) (1994) (defining negligence as "any failure to make a rea-
sonable attempt to comply with the provisions of [the Internal Revenue Code]").
13 See I.R.C. § 6664(c)(1) (1994) ("No [accuracy-related] penalty shall be im-
posed... with respect to any portion of an underpayment if it is shown that there was
a reasonable cause for such portion and the taxpayer acted in good faith with respect
to such portion.").
35 Compaq, 113 T.C. at 227.
6 Id.
137 See, e.g., Abusive Tax Shelter Shutdown Act of 1999, H.R. 2255, 106th Cong. (at-
tempting to eliminate abusive corporate tax shelters); I.R.S. Announcement 2000-12,
2000-12 I.R.B. 835 (introducing temporary and proposed regulations specifically di-
rected at corporate tax shelters);JCT PROPOSAL, supra note 5 (making suggestions to
reduce corporate tax shelter activity); TREASuRY WHITE PAPER, supra note 3 (providing
background on the corporate tax shelter problem and making proposals to solve it);
Tax Section, New York State Bar Ass'n, supra note 6 (proposing ways to combat the
corporate tax shelter problem).
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treasury of revenues,ss but the knowledge that some taxpayers are get-
ting away with it encourages others to pursue similar transactions."
The main proposals designed to curb corporate tax shelters are:
(1) increasing disclosure of tax advantaged transactions; (2) increas-
ing penalties for improper tax shelters; (3) creating consequences for
promoters, advisors, and tax-indifferent parties involved in the trans-
actions; and (4) codifying existing judicial anti-tax-avoidance doc-
trines. The specific means by which each of these proposals would be
implemented depends on the group making the proposal. What is
important at this point in the debate, however, is not to identify ex-
actly how the various proposals should be implemented, but which of
the proposals deserve the most attention.
Although Treasury has issued temporary and proposed regula-
tions on the corporate tax shelter problem, an examination of the
broader issues is still important because the corporate tax shelter de-
bate continues in Congress, Treasury, and the profession. Further-
more, the temporary and proposed regulations only address the issue
of greater corporate tax shelter disclosure, and there is still the possi-
bility that the regulations will undergo significant changes before they
become final.) Nevertheless, a more specific discussion of the regu-
lations and their requirements is included in this Comment because
they are currently the most authoritative pronouncements on the is-
sue. It should be noted that several groups have already written
lengthy comments to the Commissioner on the temporary and pro-
posed regulations, and this Comment makes no attempt to undertake
a similarly in-depth and narrow critique.1
4'
W See supra note 7 and accompanying text (stating that corporate tax shelters an-
nually reduce federal tax revenues by at least ten billion dollars).
13 ' After all, if others are able to reduce their taxes, thereby keeping more money
for themselves, why shouldn't you? See WALL STREET (20th Century Fox 1987)
("[G]reed, for lack of a better word, is good. Greed is right. Greed works."). But see
Mark 10:25 ("'It is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle than for a rich
man to enter the kingdom of God.'").
An analogous situation is presented in the question of legal ethics, in which those
lawyers that "practice closest to the line without crossing seem to gain an advantage.
Goaded by the market, conscientious lawyers ask whether they do their clients a dis-
service if they don't exploit every opening." LINCOLN CAPLAN, SKADDEN 138 (1993).
140 See T.D. 8875, 2000-11 I.R.B. 761 (requiring corporate tax shelter promoters to
maintain customer lists); T.D. 8876, 2000-11 I.R.B. 753 (requiring corporate tax shelter
registration); T.D. 8877, 2000-11 1.R.B. 747 (requiring taxpayer disclosure of participa-
tion in corporate tax shelters).
141 See, e.g., Letter from Douglas J. Antonio, Chair, Federal Taxation Committee,
Chicago Bar Association, to the Internal Revenue Service (May 17, 2000), in 2000 TAX
NOTEs TODAY 102-27, WIL 2000 TNT 102-27 [hereinafter Chicago Bar Association Let-
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A. Increase Disclosure Requirements for Tax Shelters
Increased disclosure of corporate tax shelters has the greatest po-
tential value of the proposals, and Treasury's temporary and proposed
regulations are the most significant attempt to implement any of the
proposals. Perhaps the greatest problem currently facing the Com-
missioner is finding potentially abusive transactions hidden in the mil-
lions of returns that are filed each year.14 Requiring companies to
clearly identify such transactions, as contemplated by the temporary
and proposed regulations, should allow the Commissioner to concen-
trate his resources on attacking, rather than vainly searching for, abu-
sive transactions. If the temporary and proposed regulations are suc-
cessful in forcing companies to disclose all of their "suspect"
transactions,4 " the companies will no longer be able to rely on win-
ter] (providing comments on the temporary and proposed regulations); Letter from
David A. Lifson, Chair, Tax Executive Committee, American Institute of Certified Pub-
lic Accountants, to Charles 0. Rossotti, Commissioner, Internal Revenue Service (May
31, 2000), in 2000 TAX NOTES TODAY 106-13, WL 2000 TNT 106-13 [hereinafter AICPA
letter] (same); Letter from Charles W. Shewbridge, InI, International President, Tax
Executive Institute, Inc., to the Internal Revenue Service (June 5, 2000), in 2000 TAX
NOTES TODAY 118-75, WL 2000 TNT 118-75 [hereinafter TEI letter] (same).
1 See George Hager, Treasury Targets Shelters Again, WASH. POST, July 2, 1999, at E3
("To shoot down tax shelters... the IRS must first find them, and that has proven to
be extremely difficult. Some estimates indicate that the government ferrets out or
stumbles on barely one out of 10 shelters, while the rest stay hidden in tax returns that
might never get audited.");James Lardner, Corporations Sing Gimme Tax Shelter and the
Treasury Department Gets the Blues, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 5, 1999, at 49, 49
("Today's shelters... are artfully concealed in the minutiae of a tax return."); Sum-
mers, supra note 3. ("What we see, we can act upon. What we cannot see, by defini-
tion, we cannot act upon. But what we fear is that visible corporate tax shelters are
only the tip of the iceberg.").
143 How exactly to define a corporate tax shelter is an ongoing debate to which
there is no easy answer. "Because corporate tax shelters take many different forms and
utilize many different structures, they are difficult to define with a single formulation."
TREASURY WHITE PAPER, supra note 3, at v. If there were a perfect definition of a cor-
porate tax shelter, the problem of corporate tax shelters would disappear. Congress
would merely need to pass a law stating that corporate tax shelters (as defined by the
perfect definition) are prohibited. Little related to taxation, however, is that simple.
Although a number of definitions have been proposed, seeJohnJ. Tigue, Public Enemy
No. 1-Corporate Tax Shelters, 222 N.Y. LJ. 3 (1999), the best appears to be a list of
characteristics, which is more a description, as opposed to a definition, of corporate
tax shelters. The characteristics of such a transaction include: (1) lack of economic
substance to the participating parties; (2) inconsistent financial accounting and tax
treatments; (3) involvement of tax-indifferent parties; (4) marketing activity; (5) con-
fidentiality requirements; (6) contingent or refundable fees and rescission or insur-
ance arrangements; and (7) high transaction costs. See TREASURY WHrE PAPER, supra
note 3, at 11-25 (listing characteristics of corporate tax shelters). A more humorous
description, but no less accurate, is: "'a deal done by very smart people that, absent tax
considerations, would be very stupid.'" Id. at 12 (quoting Professor Michael Graetz).
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ning the corporate tax shelter "lottey" by investing in questionable
tax shelter transactions knowing that the Commissioner is unlikely
ever to question them, and that if he does, it will only be after the pas-
sage of many years.4
1. Temporary and Proposed Regulations
a. Under§6111
The disclosure statute, § 6111 of the Code,45 was originally en-
acted in 1984, and captured within its tax shelter definition most of
the transactions then marketed to individuals.146  The statute was
amended in 1997 to include the new corporate tax shelters within the
statute's definition of transactions that must be disclosed. 47 The
amended portion of the statute, however, became effective only re-
cently when Treasury issued temporary and proposed regulations un-
der § 6111.""
Ultimately, in its temporary and proposed regulations, Treasury chose to rely on a list
of factors. See infra notes 158-65 and accompanying text (defining "reportable transac-
tion").
4 See Howard Gleckman & Lorraine Woellert, Kiss that Tax Shelter Goodbye?, Bus.
WK., Nov. 15, 1999, at 50, 50 ("'A lot of the [tax shelters] are premised on the fact that
they won't be detected. Once they are, they just don't wash.'" (quoting John E.
Chapoton, a partner at Vinson & Elkins)); Lardner, supra note 142, at 49 ("One of the
hallmarks of the modem tax shelter ... is the assumption by all parties involved that it
will be shut down if staffers at the Treasury Department or Congress happen to dis-
cover it.").
145 See I.LC. § 6111(a) (1) (1994) ("Any tax shelter organizer shall register the tax
shelter with the Secretary... not later than the day on which the first offering for sale
of interests in such tax shelter occurs.").
1 See Joseph Bankman, The New Market in Corporate Tax Shelters, 83 TAx NoTEs
1775, 1788 (1999) ("As originally enacted, its definition of tax shelter captured most of
the characteristics of the shelters marked [sic] to high-income individuals; the defini-
tion of tax shelter did not obviously encompass the new corporate tax shelters.").
147 See id. (explaining that the original disclosure statute had to be amended to
reach corporate tax shelters, which were not a problem when the statute was first en-
acted).
146 See Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, 111 Stat. 788, 928 ("[T]he
amendments made by this section shall apply to any tax shelter... interests in which
are offered to potential participants after the Secretary of the Treasury prescribes
guidance with respect to meeting requirements added by such amendments."); T.D.
8876, 2000-11 I.R.B. 753, 753 (requiring the registration of corporate tax shelters).
Treasury's delay in exercising its authority to trigger the registration requirements was
the result of a desire to wait until a final determination was made by all relevant parties
as to how to deal with corporate tax shelters. See Springsteel, supra note 7 ("[T]he rea-
son the IRS delayed guidance on the [disclosure requirements] was that the agency
wanted to make sure its application would be consistent with the broader approach,
which has been in the works since [the fall of 1998].").
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The effectiveness of the disclosure required by the temporary and
proposed regulations issued under § 6111 should be judged by
whether the scope is broad enough to capture the vast majority of
corporate tax shelters, but not so broad that the Commissioner is
overwhelmed by disclosures of legitimate transactions. 49 Whether the
current statute meets these standards is unknown since it is only since
late February 2000 that any attempt has been made to utilize it."' A
possible clue is provided, however, by the 1997 amendment, which de-
fines a tax shelter that would need to be disclosed as a transaction sub-
ject to certain confidentiality agreements."" The reason for this lan-
guage is that, historically, corporate tax shelter promoters required
prospective purchasers of their "products" to sign confidentiality
agreements as a means of protecting the value of the product. 5 2 Al-
though such agreements are still used, promoters are increasingly will-
ing to market products without them.5
It is highly likely that confidentiality agreements would disappear
completely from the tax shelter market-and be replaced by a substi-
tute, such as a "gentleman's agreement"-if it meant that the pro-
moter would not need to disclose the tax shelter to the Commissioner.
The government apparently believes that this will happen, since its es-
timate of the impact of the new § 6111 temporary and proposed regu-
lations is that only four corporate tax shelters will be registered.'4 It is
149 See Bankman, supra note 146, at 1790 ("While disclosure of the hundred or so
tax shelters extant at any moment might be extremely helpful to the IRS, receipt of all
materials relating to all or most agreements for which accounting firms and investment
banks receive fees would rob disclosure of any real utility.").
im For all practical purposes, it was not until late August 2000 that a real attempt to
require disclosure under § 6111 was made. See T.D. 8876, 2000-11 I.RB. 753, 753 (pro-
viding that no registration need be filed until August 26, 2000, 180 days after the effec-
tive date of the regulation).
1 See I.R.G. § 6111(d) (1) (Supp. IV 1998) (defining tax shelter, for purposes of
requiring disclosure, to include certain confidential arrangements).
1 See Bankman, supra note 146, at 1781 ("[A] promoter has no generally enforce-
able intellectual property rights in the idea around which the tax shelter is built. ...
Promoters attempt to limit... expropriation [of their ideas] by requiring confidential-
ity agreements from prospective purchasers and their advisors.").
See id. ("Many promoters... rely on repeat business and long-standing relation-
ships in lieu of [confidentiality] agreements."); Novack & Saunders, supra note 7, at
208 ("[P]romoters have already taken evasive action. To avoid registration, they have
stopped asking clients to sign 'confidentiality' agreements. Clients know that if they
blab, they won't see the next hot deal.").
154 See Sheryl Stratton, Disclosure Regs Overbroad and Burdensome, but Are The) Effec-
tive?, 57 TAX ANALYSTS' DAILY TAX HIGHLIGHTS & DOcuMENTS 2255, 2255 (2000) ("A
May report.., states that the government anticipates a whopping four corporate tax
shelters would be registered as a result of the regs.").
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therefore unlikely that the § 6111 temporary and proposed regula-
tions will have any effect (other than the disappearance of confidenti-
ality agreements) on corporate tax shelter activity.
Treasury was limited by the language of § 6111 in promulgating
the temporary and proposed regulations under it and cannot be
faulted for the limited effect of the regulations. Although Congress
could amend § 6111 to remove the confidentiality requirement, such
action would be unnecessary in light of the other temporary and pro-
posed regulations promulgated by Treasury, which, as discussed be-
low, provide for adequate disclosure of corporate tax shelters.
b. Under § 6112
Treasury also issued temporary and proposed regulations under
§ 6112 that require "any person who organizes or sells any interest in a
potentially abusive tax shelter [to] maintain a list identifying each per-
son who was sold an interest in such shelter.""'5 The information on
the list must be maintained for seven years, and it must be made avail-
able for inspection at the request of the Secretary of the Treasury.
To avoid the probably limited effect of the § 6111 temporary and
proposed regulations, the § 6112 temporary and proposed regulations
use a modified version of the § 6111 confidential corporate tax shelter
definition to define "potentially abusive tax shelter." Specifically, the
regulations "include[] a transaction for which a significant purpose of
the structure of the transaction is the avoidance or evasion of Federal
income tax," but do not require confidentiality or $100,000 in pro-
moters' fees.'56
The list maintenance requirement raises the cost of investing in a
transaction that may eventually be found to be a corporate tax shelter
because it allows the Commissioner to easily identify every investor in
that corporate tax shelter once he has identified a single investor.
Thus, even if a particular taxpayer initially escapes the Commis-
sioner's scrutiny by winning the audit lottery, its victory is only illusory
unless every other name on the list also wins the lottery. The resulting
change in the cost/benefit calculation for taxpayers considering the
purchase of a corporate tax shelter should reduce corporate tax shel-
ter activity, since only those corporate tax shelters that offer the great-
est benefits will be able to justify the higher cost' 57
155 T.D. 8875, 2000-11 I.R.B. 761, 761.
'Z6 Id. at 762.
157 The simple example that follows illustrates the impact of the list maintenance
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c. Under § 6011
The most important of the temporary and proposed corporate tax
shelter regulations requires taxpayer disclosure of "reportable transac-
tions" on their tax returns. 58 The disclosure is accomplished by hav-
ing the taxpayer attach a disclosure statement to its tax return for
each year that its participation in the transaction affects its tax liabil-
ity.' In addition, the taxpayer must send a copy of its disclosure
statement to the Commissioner in Washington, D.C. for the first year
that the taxpayer discloses the transaction on its retur.' 6°
The term "reportable transaction" covers two broad categories of
transactions.' 6' The first category includes transactions identical to, or
substantially similar to, those identified by the Commissioner in pub-
lished guidance as § 6011-listed transactions that are expected to re-
duce the taxpayer's tax liability by more than $1 million in any one
year, or more than $2 million for any combination of years. 162 The
second category includes transactions that contain at least two out of
six listed characteristics and are expected to reduce the taxpayer's tax
liability by more than $5 million in any one year, or more than $10
million for any combination of years. 6 3 The six listed characteristics
are: (1) the transaction was engaged in under conditions of confiden-
tiality; (2) the taxpayer is contractually protected against the loss of
part or all of the tax benefits of the transaction; (3) the party that
requirement on the odds that a particular taxpayer's involvement in an abusive corpo-
rate tax shelter will be discovered and the tax benefits disallowed. Assume that Romeo,
Rosebud & Radar is a corporate tax shelter promoter that sells a particular corporate
tax shelter to five companies. Further assume that absent the list maintenance re-
quirement each of the five companies faces only a ten percent risk that their purchase
of the corporate tax shelter will be discovered and the tax benefits disallowed. In the
absence of the list maintenance requirement, the discovery of Edick's involvement in
the corporate tax shelter would have no impact on the odds that Lloyd's involvement
would be discovered-Lloyd would still face only a ten percent risk of discovery and
disallowance. With the list maintenance requirement, however, each of the five com-
panies now faces a forty-one percent risk of discovery and disallowance: 1 - (1 -.1)5.
See Interview with ThomasJ. Brennan, Ph.D., in N.Y., N.Y. (July 29, 2000) (explaining
the mathematical principles underlying the calculation of the list maintenance re-
quirement's impact on the risk of discovery and disallowance). Comparing the differ-
ent odds demonstrates that, in this example, the list maintenance requirement more
than quadruples the risk of discovery and disallowance.
158 T.D. 8877, 2000-11 I.R.B. 747, 747.
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 Id. See I.R.S. Notice 2000-15, 2000-12 I.R.B. 826, for the initial list of § 6011 re-
portable transactions.
163 T.D. 8877, 2000-11 I.LB. 747, 747.
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promoted, sold, or recommended the transaction to the taxpayer re-
ceived, or is expected to receive, at least $100,000 in fees; (4) the tax
and book treatment of the transaction results in, or is expected to re-
sult in, at least a five million dollar difference in tax treatment; (5) the
transaction involves the participation of a party in a different tax posi-
tion than the taxpayer that allows the transaction to be structured in a
way that is more favorable for the taxpayer; and (6) the expected
characterization of the transaction for United States tax purposes dif-
fers from the expected characterization by any party to the transaction
for purposes of taxation in another country.'6 Several exceptions ex-
ist to prevent taxpayers from having to disclose transactions that have
at least two of the six characteristics, but that are nevertheless unlikely
to be corporate tax shelters. The exceptions include transactions
identified by the Commissioner in published guidance as not requir-
ing disclosure, transactions that the taxpayer has participated in "in
the ordinary course of its business in a form consistent with customary
commercial practice," and transactions for which there is no reason-
able basis for the Commissioner to deny any significant portion of the
expected tax benefits.5
Despite Treasury's best efforts to write the temporary and pro-
posed regulations so that only significant corporate tax shelters will be
disclosed, the regulations have been criticized as overly broad.166 It is
asserted that the regulations generally capture every transaction a tax-
payer engages in and do not contain adequate exceptions, thus re-
quiring taxpayers to disclose more transactions than the Commis-
sioner could ever investigate. Most of these criticisms seem to ignore
(perhaps unsurprisingly given that many corporate tax shelters are
based on a similarly myopic reading of the law) the clear intent of the
regulations to primarily capture corporate tax shelters. For example,
the exceptions for transactions that are entered into in the ordinary
course of business and in a customary form are designed to eliminate
from disclosure many of the everyday transactions that various groups
misinterpreting the regulations fear will have to be disclosed.
Nevertheless, if taxpayers are advised by their tax counsel to dis-
close every transaction, then the temporary and proposed regulations
I" Id.
165 Id.
1 See, e.g., Chicago Bar Association Letter, supra note 141 (identifying concerns
that the temporary and proposed regulations contain definitions that capture too
many transactions not normally considered tax shelters); AICPA letter, supra note 141
(same); TE letter, supra note 141 (same).
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will prove ineffective as the Commissioner will be left in virtually the
same position as he is now, except with thicker returns. While this
outcome is unlikely given the tremendous expenditure of resources
taxpayers would have to make and the degree to which Treasury's in-
tent would have to be misinterpreted, it would require Treasury to re-
consider the temporary and proposed regulations. One solution
might be to impose a penalty on taxpayers who make frivolous disclo-
sures. Another possible solution, and the one urged by the tax profes-
sionals claiming that the regulations are overly broad, would be to
narrow the definition of reportable transaction or to expand the ex-
ceptions. These are less attractive alternatives, however, as they would
simply give the corporate tax shelter organizers and promoters more
room in which to maneuver-the likely purpose behind their dire
predictions.
With the temporary and proposed regulations now in place, it
would be wise to "'see how [they] actually work'" before making
changes. 16 If they are as seriously flawed as the criticisms mentioned
above would suggest, then taxpayers, Treasury, and the Commissioner
will have plenty of evidence to support changes soon enough. On the
other hand, all interested parties may discover, to the displeasure of
some, that Treasury has struck a fatal blow against corporate tax shel-
ters.
2. Additional Disclosure Proposals
Several of the proposals to increase disclosure suggest requiring a
corporate official to sign the disclosure, attesting to its veracity and to
the legitimacy of the transaction. 68 "Certification would... increase
the significance of an aggressive transaction in the organiza-
don .... The combination of factual disclosure and involvement of a
senior executive officer will get behavior modification.... which
would be more effective than the threat of penalties, litigation, or
audits."'69 The idea is that once the company official becomes person-
ally associated with the transaction, he will be more concerned about
167 Ryan J. Donmoyer, Archer Rebuffs Treasury Call for Shelter Legislation, 2000 TAX
NOTES TODAY 56-3, WL 2000 TNT 56-3 (quoting Congressman William Archer).
1 See, e.g., Abusive Tax Shelter Shutdown Act of 1999, H.R. 2255, 106th Cong.
(1999) (requiring a statement signed by a senior corporate officer attesting to the ve-
racity of the facts and conclusions relied upon in reporting the disclosed transaction).
6 Sheryl Stratton, Tax Shelter Approaches Debated, 2000 TAx NOTEs TODAY 15-2, WL
2000 TNT 15-2.
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its merits and will refuse to participate in the most egregious
schemes.""
Interestingly, Compaq sought to accomplish the same goal as this
proposal, albeit through the use of a slightly different method. In its
opinion, the Tax Court unveiled its newest weapon in the arsenal
against corporate tax shelters: the "scarlet letter."' The name of
JamesJ. Tempesta, an assistant treasurer at Compaq who was primarily
responsible for Compaq's involvement in the ADR transaction, ap-
pears more than a dozen times in the Tax Court's opinion.' The
court even went so far as to discuss Tempesta's educational back-
ground in the opinion. It is hard to imagine how anyone with ca-
reer ambitions would be indifferent about having his name appear
numerous times within a court opinion adverse to his company, and
in which a transaction for which he is responsible is declared a
sham. 74 Corporate employees responsible for recommending transac-
tions for their companies to pursue may be more cautious if they can-
not expect to hide behind the corporate cloak as unnamed, and
unmentioned, actors when things go bad.
The Senate Finance Committee must also be thinking of the effec-
D See Ian Springsteel, Trojan Horses, CHIEF EXEcUTIVE, Oct. 1999, at 20, 20, avail-
able at 1999 WL 14843176 ("'Once executive officers are on the line, they will insist that
the real due diligence on these transactions get done, with the result that most will
never be entered into' .... " (quoting Stefan F. Tucker, a partner at Tucker, Flyer LLP
and chair of the ABA Section of Taxation)).
171 See NATHANIEL HAwrHORNE, THE SCARLET LETTER 43 (Scully Bradley et al. eds.,
W. W. Norton & Co., 2d ed. 1978) (1850) (describing the large red "A" that an adul-
terer was required to wear as punishment for her crime).
72 Compaq Computer Corp. v. Comm'r, 113 T.C. 214 (1999).
17, See id. at 216 ("He received his undergraduate degree in philosophy and gov-
ernment from Georgetown University and his master's degree in finance and account-
ing from the University of Texas.").
174 See Bankman, supra note 146, at 1784 ("Executives often bring up the possibility
of public exposure in evaluating a prospective shelter .... "); Springsteel, supra note
170, at 20 (noting that the first question every CEO should ask when considering
whether to pursue a tax savings transaction is: "What do you believe would happen to
the employee, community, and customer image of the company and its brand if the
company were named as part of a tax avoidance scheme?"). But see Bankman, supra
note 146, at 1784 (stating that the executive most responsible for Colgate-Palmolive's
participation in the transaction at issue in ACM Partnership v. Commissioner, 157 F.3d
231 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1017 (1999), "got promoted, notwithstanding
the seemingly unfavorable publicity and unfavorable outcome of the ensuing case"); cf.
JOE DOMANICK, FAIrNG IT IN AMERICA: BARRY MINKOW AND THE GREAT ZZZZ BEST
SCA M 280 (1989) (describing the dozens ofjob offers that Mark Morze received even
as he awaited sentencing for his involvement with the financial and securities fraud at
ZZZZ Best). On the other hand, maybe a certain thrill is derived from seeing one's
own name in print.
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tiveness of the scarlet letter in controlling behavior. It has proposed
that any company that pays more than one million dollars in corpo-
rate tax shelter related penalties in any year disclose that fact to
shareholders. 175 Most shareholders would likely find such a disclosure
troubling since it means that the company has both lost the money it
paid to participate in the corporate tax shelter, and unnecessarily paid
an additional sum to the government.' 76 Out of concern for their pro-
fessional survival, corporate executives generally want to avoid black
marks, such as "investments" questionable enough to give rise to un-
derstatement penalties, that shareholders and the market could inter-
pret as indicators that they are not running the company as efficiently
as others could.
B. Increase Penalties for Engaging in Abusive Tax Shelters
As demonstrated in Compaq, the existing penalty system can, and
will, be used against parties that engage in corporate tax shelters.' 7
The initial point to realize about any penalty system, however, is that it
will only be as effective as the mechanism used to discover transactions
that are subject to the penalty. Given the current difficulty the Com-
missioner has in discovering tax shelter transactions, 78 increasing the
understatement penalty will not, by itself, be effective. 79  Under the
current detection system, taxpayers simply do not face a great enough
175 See Ryan J. Donmoyer & Heidi Glenn, Finance Antishelter Draft' Boosts Penalties,
Standards of Conduct 2000 TAX NOTES TODAY 102-1, WL 2000 TNT 102-1 (stating that
the Senate Finance Committee staff proposal would require corporations to disclose
penalty payments).
176 It is true that a shareholder might be pleased by the penalties as they indicate
that the company is aggressively seeking to limit its tax liability, thereby leaving more
money available for investment in ongoing operations or dividend payout. This view
seems a bit overly optimistic, however, as it ignores the fact that shareholders can be
certain about the costs that management has incurred-the penalties-but will always
lack any particular knowledge about the benefits achieved-the tax savings that went
undetected. Management cannot sensibly publicize the tax savings, since to do so
would be to alert the Commissioner to the fact that he should take another look at the
com any and its tax returns.
Compaq Computer Corp. v. Comm'r, 113 T.C. 214, 226-27 (1999); see infra
notes 188-91 (describing the historical application of penalties in corporate tax shelter
cases and the limited effort apparently necessary to avoid them).
178 See supra notes 142-44 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulty the
Commissioner currently has in finding corporate tax shelter transactions).
179 Several of the proposals, apparently recognizing this fact, would impose an in-
creased penalty but allow for it to be reduced if the taxpayer makes certain disclosures.
See infra note 204 and accompanying text (describing the proposed penalty revisions).
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risk of detection for any reasonable penalty to serve as an adequate
deterrent.' 8'
Although increased penalties may not deter taxpayers from engag-
ing in tax shelters, there is a concern that they may deter taxpayers
from engaging in legitimate transactions for fear of the possibility of
being assessed a large penalty. 8' Such a concern is unfounded, how-
ever, as the current system uses a negligence standard 82 and requires
only that the taxpayer make a reasonable attempt to comply with the
tax laws. '3 Furthermore, the penalty does not apply to any portion of
an understatement for which "there is or was substantial authority for
such treatment"'" unless the understatement is attributable to a tax
shelter, in which case the taxpayer must also show that he "reasonably
believed that the tax treatment of such item by the taxpayer was more
likely than not the proper treatment. " 185 Finally, "[n]o penalty shall be
imposed... with respect to any portion of an underpayment if it is
shown that there was a reasonable cause for such portion and that the
taxpayer acted in good faith with respect to such portion."'86 It was
the inability of Compaq to meet even these minimum standards that
led the court to assess a penalty in that case.
1. Greatly simplifying the cost/benefit factors a taxpayer would consider in deter-
mining whether to engage in a particular corporate tax shelter will make clearjust how
large a penalty would need to be. In the first example, Colleen &Josh is considering a
tax shelter that will save it $100 if undetected, but that will be completely disallowed if
discovered. Assume, however counterfactual it may be, that the transaction faces a
50% risk of detection. Only if the penalty rate is at least 100% will Colleen & Josh
choose not to engage in the transaction: ($100 * .50) < ($X * .50). In the second ex-
ample,Julien is considering the same transaction, but now the risk of detection is only
25%. Under these conditions, the penalty rate would need to be at least 300% forJu-
lien to pass on the transaction: ($100 * .75) < ($X * .25). But see KennethJ. Kies, A
Critical Look at the Administration's 'Corporate Tax Shelter' Proposals, 83 TAx NOTEs 1463,
1476 (1999) ("[T]he accuracy-related penalty provides a powerful incentive for corpo-
rate tax executives to review closely and analyze both the structure and the implemen-
tation of any proposed business transaction that results in tax benefits, and to impose
prudence on the decision-making process.").
-1 See Bankman, supra note 146, at 1794 ("The complaint against the high penalty
rate under the Treasury proposals is ... that the government would incorrectly apply
the penalty provisions to non-shelter transactions, or that investors would fear such
incorrect application.").
1'2 See I.LC. § 6662(b) (1) (1994) (stating that the accuracy-related penalty applies
when the underpayment is attributable to negligence).
IN.4 See I.R.C. § 6662(c) (1994) (defining negligence as "any failure to make a rea-
sonable attempt to comply with the provisions of [the Internal Revenue Code]").
a I.R.C. § 6662(d) (2) (B) (i) (1994).
I.RC. § 6662(d) (2) (C) (i) (II) (1994).
I.R.C. § 6664(c) (1) (1994).
1 7 See Compaq Computer Corp. v. Comm'r, 113 T.C. 214, 227 (1999) (stating that
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In fact, although nothing in the language of the existing under-
statement penalty specifically prevents its application in corporate tax
shelter cases, it has only rarely been applied in such cases. The courts
have ordinarily given a broad reading to the reasonable cause test
whereby the taxpayer's possession of a more-likely-than-not opinion
serves to establish that there was a reasonable basis for the transaction,
thus avoiding imposition of a penalty." Given the large number of
tax lawyers in the United States, and their differing interpretations of
the tax laws, a taxpayer can generally obtain a more-likely-than-not
opinion for any corporate tax shelter transaction. As a result, corpo-
rate tax shelter "[o]pinions are like pasties and G-strings. They at-
tempt to obscure what is really going on but do not succeed.",8
In an effort to provide more consistency in tax opinions, particu-
larly with respect to corporate tax shelter transactions, Treasury has
proposed to revise Circular No. 230, which provides requirements for
tax professionals that practice before the Internal Revenue Service.'"
The current requirements were not designed with corporate tax shel-
ter opinion writing in mind, and thus do not provide sufficient incen-
tive for tax professionals to question the propriety of writing a suspect
opinion. The presently available sanctions are suspension of an indi-
vidual's ability to practice before the Internal Revenue Service, dis-
barment of an individual from practice before the Internal Revenue
Service, and, in at least some cases, private reprimand. 91 Groups have
proposed that the sanctions be expanded to include "public cen-
sure, "192 "the imposition of fines in amounts bearing a reasonable rela-
tionship to the practitioner misconduct,"'9 and the "exten[sion of]
Compaq "offered no evidence that it satisfied the 'reasonable and ordinarily prudent
person' standard or relied on the advice of its tax department or counsel").
188 See David C. Garlock, A Tax Executive's Guide to Evaluating Tax-Oriented Transac-
tions, at http://www.bna.com/tmweb/memo3.htm (last modified Oct. 27, 1998) (stat-
ing that to avoid an understatement penalty a corporation needs "to obtain a more-
likely-than-not (or stronger) opinion from a reputable tax advisor unrelated to the
promoter that is based on the actual facts of the transaction and that contains a rea-
sonable discussion of the transaction's business purpose and economic substance").
189 Lee A. Sheppard, Shelter Opinions: The Tax Equivalent of Pasties, 87 TAX NOTES
17, 20 (2000).
190 See I.RS. Announcement 2000-51, 2000-22 I.RB. 1141, 1141-42 (inviting com-
ments on proposed revisions to Circular No. 230).
191 Letter from James E. Merritt, Chair, American College of Tax Counsel, to Neal
Wollin, General Counsel, Department of the Treasury (July 27, 2000), in 2000 TAX
NOTES TODAY 158-44, WL 2000 TNT.
192 Id.
193 Id.
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sanctions to the practitioner's firm. " 194 It is hoped that these addi-
tional sanctions will provide greater flexibility in matching the seri-
ousness of the practitioner's wrongful conduct to the punishment,
thereby increasing the likelihood that the practitioner will be sanc-
tioned.1"5
In addition to new sanctions, other proposed revisions relate to
the content of tax opinions. Tax opinions that are to be used by tax-
payers to meet the reasonable cause exception ("reasonable cause
opinions") should be required to "address and opine on the applica-
bility ofjudicial, statutory and regulatory doctrines that could apply to
the tax shelter transaction."96 The opinion writer should also be re-
quired to "undertake an adequate factual inquiry" before rendering
such an opinion.
To further protect the reasonable cause exception from tax opin-
ion abuse, separate revisions should apply to tax opinions provided to
corporate tax shelter promoters to be used as marketing material.
Such opinions should be required to state that they may not be relied
upon by a taxpayer for purposes of meeting the reasonable cause ex-
ception, should "address all material tax aspects of the proposed
transaction, including the judicial, statutory and regulatory doctrines
that are required to be addressed in a reasonable cause opinion," and
should "be based on a detailed set of hypothetical facts." 98
Adopting the above-suggested revisions should help clarify the re-
quirements a tax opinion must meet before it can be used as a basis
for satisfying the reasonable cause exception. In addition, with ap-
propriate publicity regarding the revisions, taxpayers will be more
likely to seek their own tax opinions addressed to the specific facts of
the transaction that they are contemplating, instead of relying on a
generic tax opinion provided to the corporate tax shelter promoter.1
194 Letter from Robert H. Scarborough, Tax Section, New York State Bar Associa-
tion, to Charles 0. Rossotti, Commissioner, Internal Revenue Service, and Jonathan
Talisman, Acting Assistant Secretary (Tax Policy), Department of the Treasury (July 31,
2000), in 2000 TAX NOTES TODAY 150-31, WL 2000 TNT 150-31 [hereinafter NYSBA
Circular No. 230 letter].
195 See Letter from Barry Roy, Director for Quality Assurance and Risk Manage-
ment, Deloitte & Touche, to Charles 0. Rossotti, Commissioner, Internal Revenue
Service (Aug. 14, 2000), in 2000 TAX NOTES TODAY 169-19, IL 2000 TNT 169-19
("The severity of the suspension or disbarrment [sic] sanctions may limit their useful-
ness in addressing less egregious violations of the Circular 230 standards.").
NYSBA Circular No. 230 letter, supra note 194.
' Id.
1 Id.
Vk, At least one commentator has argued that there should be strict liability penal-
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Combining the content revisions with new sanctions should make
every tax opinion more valuable in determining the legitimacy of a
transaction, which is, after all, the purpose of the tax opinions.
The Compaq case does not deal with this issue directly because no
opinion letter was ever obtained in that case."* The court relied on
this fact, however, in assessing an understatement penalty, citing it as
evidence of the minimal investigation Compaq undertook of the
transaction."' Whether the court would have reached a different con-
clusion with respect to the penalty if Compaq had an opinion letter is
unknown, since the court also called attention to the extensive tax
knowledge of the Compaq employees involved and indicated that they
should have known the transaction was a sham. °2
Despite the above discussion, an increased penalty would be bene-
203
ficial when used in combination with increased disclosure. In this
context, the penalty would serve primarily as an incentive for taxpay-
ers to comply with the disclosure requirements, not merely as a deter-
rent to engaging in corporate tax shelter transactions. Many of the
proposals suggest increasing the penalty 20% (its current level) to
40%, but allowing for it to be reduced to 20% if the taxpayer properly
discloses the suspect transaction.'" By disclosing a transaction, there-
fore, the taxpayer would automatically reduce by 50% any accuracy-
related penalty it might need to pay if the Commissioner eventually
determines that the transaction was illegitimate. If a taxpayer chooses
to engage in a transaction that might lead to the imposition of a pen-
alty, the taxpayer will take all reasonable steps to minimize the
amount of the eventual penalty, if any. Furthermore, the penalty re-
ties for "[sophisticated corporate taxpayers" because they "know exactly what kind of
return positions they are taking and should not be able to hide behind lawyers' letter-
heads." Sheppard, supra note 189, at 20; see also NYSBA Circular No. 230 letter, supra
note 194 ("[T]he Tax Section is on record as supporting a 'strict liability' standard for
the imposition of penalties in connection with underpayments attributable to tax shel-
ter transactions. Adopting strict liability would eliminate taxpayers' reliance on opin-
ions.., of tax advisors ... as a defense to accuracy-related penalties.").
200 See Compaq, 113 T.C. at 227 ("If any communications occurred in which consid-
eration was given to the correctness of [Compaq's] tax return position when the re-
turn was prepared and filed, [Compaq] has chosen not to disclose those communica-
tions.").
201 Id.
202 Id.
203 See supra Part IV.A (arguing that increased disclosure is crucial to any attempt to
deal with the corporate tax shelter problem).
204 See, e.g., Abusive Tax Shelter Shutdown Act of 1999, H.L 2255, 106th Cong.
(1999) (stating that the understatement penalty rate should be increased to 40% for
corporate tax shelters, but be reduced to 20% if there is appropriate disclosure);
"REASURYWHrrE PAPER, supra note 3, at 87 (same).
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duction is simply a "bonus" for complying (as the taxpayer would be
legally obligated to do) with the disclosure requirements.
C. Create Consequences for Promoters, Advisors, and Tax-Indifferent
Parties Involved in Tax Shelter Transactions
Many corporate tax shelters rely on tax-indifferent parties"  for
their success.'O' Although the specific transactions can be quite com-
plex, the general idea is to allocate a disproportionate amount of the
revenue to the tax-indifferent party and a disproportionate amount of
the expenses to the taxpayer that purchased the tax shelter.27 A tax-
indifferent party is unconcerned about receiving "extra" income be-
cause, by definition, it is not subject to United States tax on the trans-
action. The tax shelter purchaser, on the other hand, receives extra
tax benefits that can be used to reduce its overall tax liability.
The general theme behind proposals relating to tax-indifferent
parties is to subject them to tax on any income attributable to their
participation in a corporate tax shelter. 8 As part of this scheme, andowing to the fact that many of these parties are not within reach of the
See Revenue Raising Proposals: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 106th
Cong. (1999), available at 1999 WL 16946747 [hereinafter Hearings] (testimony of
Donald C. Lubick, Assistant Treasury Secretary) ("Tax indifferent parties include for-
eign persons, tax-exempt organizations, Native American tribal organizations, and tax-
payers with loss or credit carry forwards."). Finding a tax-indifferent party willing to
participate in a corporate tax shelter should not be hard. For example, consider that
currently "[t]here are more than a million tax-exempt organizations in the United
States." BarnabyW. Zall, Welcome to Our Board-Oh, by the Way, Now You Owe Taxes, BUS.
L. TODAYJan./Feb. 2000, at 9, 9.
See, e.g., ACM P'ship v. Comm'r, 157 F.3d 231, 242 (3d Cir. 1998) (noting that
one partner in the transaction, a foreign corporation not subject to U.S. tax, was allo-
cated nearly eighty-three percent of the transaction's gain), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1017
(1999).
!,17 See Hearings, supra note 205 (testimony of Donald C. Lubick, Assistant Treasury
Secretary) ("[T]ax indifferent parties absorb the taxable income from the transaction,
leaNing tax losses to be allocated to the corporation."). A greatly simplified example
can make this more concrete. Megan, a tax-indifferent party, and Eileen, the tax shel-
ter purchaser, enter into a transaction that requires a total capital contribution of
$100. Megan contributes $5 and Eileen $95. In the first year, the transaction gener-
ates total income of $1000 and total expenses of $1100. Megan is allocated 80% of the
income, $800, but only 20% of the expenses, $220, for a net profit of $580. Eileen is
allocated 20% of the income, $200, and 80% of the expenses, $880, for a net loss of
$680. Megan is not taxed on her "profit" and Eileen has a "loss" of $680 that she can
use to offset her other income.
L"- See, e.g., TREASURY WHITE PAPER, supra note 3, at 108 ("Under the Administra-
tion's ... proposal, any income received by a tax-indifferent person with respect to a
corporate tax shelter would be taxable to such person.").
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Commissioner, the proposals would make all participants in the tax
shelter jointly and severally liable for the tax-indifferent party's tax
bill.2 9  The overriding problem with this system is that it is not
needed.2 1 0 Relying on the current judicial doctrines (such as the sham
transaction doctrine), the Commissioner, when confronted with an
abusive transaction that improperly creates tax benefits for a taxpayer
by involving a tax-indifferent party, simply needs to reallocate the in-
come and expenses to reflect the substance of the transaction.2 1' The
tax benefits created by the transaction disappear, and the taxpayer
pays the substantively appropriate amount of tax. Currently, things do
not always work this smoothly, but any shortcomings result, not from a
lack of tools available to the Commissioner, but instead from a lack of
awareness about particular transactions in which tax-indifferent par-
ties are involved. As already discussed, increased disclosure require-
ments would obviate the problem.'
12
Another proposal, designed to create consequences for promoters
213and advisors, imposes an excise tax on the fees they receive for their
214corporate tax shelter activities. The motivation behind an excise tax
is that it will discourage promoters and advisors from participating in
tax shelters by reducing their profitability. An excise tax on promot-
ers and advisors, therefore, is akin to an accuracy-related penalty on11 211
taxpayers, and consequently faces the same problems. Of particular
209 See, e.g., id. ("To ensure that a tax is paid, all corporate participants [in the tax
shelter] would be made joint and severally liable for the tax.").
210 See Bankman, supra note 146, at 1795 ("The tax indifferent party provi-
sion ... would have its real effect not in the actual taxation of such parties... but in
the joint and several liability provisions, which would place such tax on the domestic
participants in a shelter. Recharacterization under existing law has the same effect.").
This principle can be demonstrated by referring to the previous example involv-
ing Megan and Eileen, supra note 207. The substance of the transaction is that it pro-
duced a net loss of $100, which should be allocated $5 to Megan and $95 to Eileen be-
cause of their initial capital contributions. After the reallocation, the transaction is no
longer abusive, but instead reflects its substance.
See supra Part IVA (asserting that increasing disclosure of potentially abusive
transactions should permit the Commissioner to more readily attack those transactions
that are abusive).
213 Although the Big Five accounting firms are the leading promoters of tax shel-
ters today, investment banks (such as Twenty-First) and some law firms are also active
in the field. See Novack & Saunders, supra note 7, at 199 (identifying the main parties
in the corporate tax shelter arena).
214 See, e.g., TREASURY WHITE PAPER, supra note 3, at 109 (proposing a twenty-five
percent excise tax to be assessed on "the fees earned by promoters and advisors with
respect to a corporate tax shelter transaction").
215 See supra notes 177-80 and accompanying text (describing problems with in-
creasing penalties as a means to reduce corporate tax shelter activity).
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importance is that it will only be an effective deterrent if the Commis-
sioner is able to readily detect corporate tax shelters, which histori-
216cally has not been the case.
As with the accuracy-related penalty, however, an excise tax might
be used as a means to incentivize promoters and advisors to comply
with disclosure requirements (if, in fact, the disclosure requirements
applied to them). This would require that all properly disclosed
transactions be exempted from the excise tax. Absent an exemption,
promoters and advisors would not be anxious to disclose their corpo-
rate tax shelter activities because doing so would be the equivalent of
telling the government that they owe it money. Financially, the pro-
moters and advisors would be better off leaving it to the government
to try to figure out what, if anything, is owed because, like the current
corporate tax shelter lottery, the government would undoubtedly
come up short. On the other hand, by exempting the disclosed activi-
ties, the promoters and advisors would be encouraged to disclose to
save themselves a substantial amount of money-equal to the amount
of the excise tax, which might be as much as twenty-five percent of all
corporate tax shelter fees.
217
D. Codif ExistingJudicialDoctrines
Proposals to codify existing judicial anti-tax-avoidance doctrines to
disallow the tax benefits created by corporate tax shelters are of lim-
ited value considering the success of the Commissioner in using them
to challenge such transactions.215 Once the Commissioner discovers
these transactions, there is normally little evidence for the taxpayer to
point to to establish their legitimacy.219 Furthermore, there is a con-
2 See supra notes 14243 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulty the
Commissioner currently has in uncovering corporate tax shelter transactions).
A7 See supra note 214 and accompanying text (describing the proposed excise tax
on corporate tax shelter fees).
215 See, e.g., ACM P'ship v. Comm'r, 157 F.3d 231, 250, 254 (3d Cir. 1998) (disallow-
ing the tax benefits arising from a transaction because it lacked both economic sub-
stance and a business purpose), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1017 (1999); Rice's Toyota World,
Inc. v. Comm'r, 752 F.2d 89, 95 (4th Cir. 1985) (same); Compaq Computer Corp. v.
Comm'r, 113 T.C. 214, 222-25 (1999) (same); see also Kies, supra note 180, at 1479
("Recent applications of [the judicial] doctrines have demonstrated their effectiveness
and cast doubt on Treasury's asserted need for additional tools.").
k19See Gleckman & Woellert, supra note 144, at 50 ("'A lot of the [tax shelters] are
premised on the fact that they won't be detected. Once they are, theyjust don't wash'
.... " (quoting John E. Chapoton, a partner at Vinson & Elkins, LLP)); Lardner, supra
note 142, at 49 ("Most shelters... fail an elementary legal test: They lack any substan-
tial purpose other than the creation of the tax benefit itself.").
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cern that the more the Commissioner is required to rely on specific
statutory language in the Code, the greater becomes the opportunity
210for tax shelter promoters to find new loopholes.
One potential advantage of codification is that it might allow the
government to save some of the tremendous costs associated with liti-
221gation by reducing the need to litigate tax cases. Whether litigation
would actually decrease, however, is questionable. Under the current
system, the Commissioner may rely on the judicial doctrines to disal-
low claimed tax benefits. 222 If the taxpayer disagrees, he may go to
court and present his arguments as to why the doctrines do not apply
at all, or at least not in the manner claimed by the Commissioner, to
the particular transaction at issue. Under a system in which those
doctrines have been codified, the same opportunity will exist for the
taxpayer, except that he will have to argue based on statutory lan-
guage instead of case law (at least until sufficient time has passed to
allow for the development of new case law).22
Another potential benefit of codification, related to the previous
one, is that it might create greater certainty for taxpayers when they
attempt to assess how the tax law will treat a particular transaction.
The assumption is that Congress will write new laws that are clear and
allow taxpayers to readily determine whether a transaction they are
22 See Hearings, supra note 205 (testimony of Donald C. Lubick, Assistant Treasury
Secretary) ("Bright-line/safe-harbor tests... encourage aggressive positions and play-
ing the examination lottery.... [A] degree of uncertainty may be useful in discourag-
ing taxpayers from venturing too close to the edge, and thereby going over the edge,
of established principles."); Gleckman & Woellert, supra note 144, at 50 ("[A] statute
runs the risk of reopening loopholes the courts have been dosing.... [I] t would do
little more than provide a new roadmap for circumventing the law."). But see Spring-
steel, supra note 7 ("'Taxpayers would be better off if Treasury had more resources, in
order to create a clearer line through more guidance. After all, what's wrong with a
clear line, as long as you're on the right side of it?'" (quoting Edward Kleinbard, a
partner at Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton)).
21 The relevant argument suggests that taxpayers would be less likely to contest the
Commissioner's position if he were relying on the explicit language of the Code in-
stead of an interpretation of ajudicial opinion. See Bankman, supra note 146, at 1788
("Courts give much greater deference to a position clearly incorporated in regulations
than the same position supported only by an interpretation of case law.").
222 See Kies, supra note 180, at 1478 ("Pursuant to several 'common-law' tax doc-
trines, Treasury and the Service have the ability to challenge taxpayer treatment of a
transaction that they believe is inconsistent with statutory rules and the underlying
con-essional intent.").
See Lee A. Sheppard, Whistling Dixie About Corporate Tax Shelters, 85 TAX NoTES
569, 570 (1999) (noting that corporate tax shelter purchasers "might carry on invest-
ing in shelters while litigating the new legal questions presented by the government's
wish list of proposals").
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considering is legitimate, or instead, an illegitimate corporate tax
shelter. An initial problem with this assumption is that it relies on
Congress to write clear and unambiguous statutes that are neither too
broad, and thus an impediment to legitimate transactions, nor too
narrow, and thus ineffective. Furthermore, would existing case law be
supplanted, or merely supplemented, by such statutes? If the answer
is supplanted, that places far more reliance on Congress's ability to
write statutes with the appropriate scope because there will be no al-
ternative means of enforcement. If the answer is merely supple-
mented, what purpose does the codification serve?
Finally, although the current judicial doctrines may not always
produce the quick and easy answer some people would desire, they do
provide a well developed framework to guide any analysis.224 Gray ar-
eas definitely exist in the case law,2 5 as they would in any reasonable
codification, but corporate tax personnel can assess the merits of most
products offered by corporate tax shelter promoters.22b In Compaq, for
example, the Tax Court made it quite clear that the taxpayer should
have been able to determine that the ADR transaction was a sham
transaction. 7
CONCLUSION
There is no question that corporate tax shelters are a growing
concern in the United States. Promoters and advisors expend large
amounts of resources to develop and market the tax shelters, and in
exchange they receive substantial fees from corporate purchasers anx-
ious to reduce their tax bills. Recent court cases give only a glimpse of
the industry, its "products," and the effect on the federal treasury.
What action, if any, Congress will take to deal with the problem
remains to be seen. Treasury has taken the most important step by
issuing temporary and proposed regulations that require disclosure of
potential tax shelter transactions; increased disclosure should allow
=4 See, e.g., supra Part II (describing the analysis that occurs under the sham trans-
action doctrine).
Lz1 See, e.g., supra Part IIA.l.b (examining whether profit potential should be de-
termined on a present value basis).
ZZ6 See Bankrnan, supra note 146, at 1793 ("[T]he Uudicial] doctrines as applied
have played a quite useful role.... Practitioners have understood the judicial applica-
tion of those doctrines--understood in the sense of sharing a consensus as to which
transactions are apt to be successfuly [sic] challenged under those doctrines.").
Z,7 See Compaq Computer Corp. v. Comm'r, 113 T.C. 214, 227 (1999) (stating that
the taxpayer's employees involved in the ADR transaction "should have been alerted to
the questionable economic nature of the ADR transaction").
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the Commissioner to concentrate his resources on evaluating the le-
gitimacy of the suspect transactions, instead of searching aimlessly for
them. While the debate continues about what other steps, if any, to
take, it is an excellent opportunity to observe what impact the tempo-
rary and proposed regulations will have.
Even if the temporary and proposed regulations ultimately lead to
the demise of corporate tax shelters, there is a substantial amount of
money at stake, and it is unlikely that the industry and its customers
will go away without a struggle. In the past, the Commissioner has
successfully used judicially created tax-avoidance doctrines such as the
sham transaction doctrine to combat abusive tax shelters, once they
were discovered, and he will continue to do so in the future.
